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Secure Key-Evolving Protocols for Discrete Logarithm Schemes

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Topics in Cryptology — CT-RSA 2002 (CT-RSA 2002)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2271))

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Abstract

This paper addresses the security and efficiency of key-evolving protocols. We identify forward-secrecy and backward-secrecy as the security goals for key-evolving and present two protocols to achieve these goals. The first protocol is operated in Z p * and is efficient for the secret-key holder; the second one is operated in Z n *, and is efficient for the public-key holder. For both protocols, we provide proofs and analysis for correctness, security and efficiency.

This work is supported in part by Ministry of Education, National Science Council of Taiwan, and Lee & MTI Center, National Chiao Tung University.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science and Information Engineering Department, National Chiao Tung University, 30050, Taiwan

    Lu Cheng-Fen & ShiuhPyng Winston Shieh

Authors
  1. Lu Cheng-Fen
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  2. ShiuhPyng Winston Shieh
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Electrical Engineering, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, 3001, Leuven-Heverlee, Belgium

    Bart Preneel

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© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Cheng-Fen, L., Shieh, S.W. (2002). Secure Key-Evolving Protocols for Discrete Logarithm Schemes. In: Preneel, B. (eds) Topics in Cryptology — CT-RSA 2002. CT-RSA 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2271. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45760-7_21

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45760-7_21

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-43224-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45760-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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