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A New Offiine Privacy Protecting E-cash System with Revokable Anonymity

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Information Security (ISC 2002)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2433))

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Abstract

Some privacy-protecting electronic payment systems [2],[13], [15],[17] have been proposedto realize the revocable anonymity among users. In this paper, organizing all users into a group, we present a new fair off-line electronic cash system (E-Cash for short). This new E-Cash system is more efficient andmore secure. The system is able of coin tracing ando wner tracing. The anonymity of the system can be revocable under certain conditions by an off-line trusted third authority, the system is untraceable (under normal cases), unlinkable and double-spending resistant. Furthermore, compared with the previous E-Cash systems, our payment protocol is more efficient in computing.

For example, under the cases where there are suspect criminal activities,e.g blackmailing or money laundering

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Communication Systems, University of Hagen, D-58084, Hagen, Germany

    Weidong Qiu

  2. Dept of Computer Science andEngineering, Shanghai Jiaotong University, 200030, Shanghai, China

    Kefei Chen & Dawu Gu

Authors
  1. Weidong Qiu
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  2. Kefei Chen
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  3. Dawu Gu
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. College of Computer Science, Northeastern University, 02115, Boston, MA, USA

    Agnes Hui Chan

  2. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Maryland, 20742, College Park, MD, USA

    Virgil Gligor

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© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Qiu, W., Chen, K., Gu, D. (2002). A New Offiine Privacy Protecting E-cash System with Revokable Anonymity. In: Chan, A.H., Gligor, V. (eds) Information Security. ISC 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2433. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45811-5_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45811-5_13

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-44270-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45811-1

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