Abstract
A model to describe the spontaneous formation of military and economic coalitions among a group of countries is proposed using spin glass theory. Between each couple of countries, there exists a bond exchange coupling which is either zero, cooperative or conflicting. It depends on their common history, specific nature, and cannot be varied. Then, given a frozen random bond distribution, coalitions are found to spontaneously form. However they are also unstable making the system very disordered. Countries shift coalitions all the time. Only the setting of macro extra national coalition are shown to stabilize alliances among countries. The model gives new light on the recent instabilities produced in Eastern Europe by the Warsow pact dissolution at odd to the previous communist stability. Current European stability is also discussed with respect to the European Union construction.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
S. Galam, Y. Gefen and Y. Shapir, Sociophysics: “A mean behavior model for the process of strike” Math. J. of Sociology 9, 1–13(1982)
S. Moss de Oliveira, P.M.C. de Oliveira, and D. Stauffer, Evolution, Money, War, and Computers-Non-Traditional Applications of Computational Statistical Physics, Teubner, Stuttgart-Leipzig, ISBN 3-519-00279-5 5 (1999)
S. Solomon, G. Weisbuch, L. de Arcangelis, N. Jan and D. Stauffer, Social percolation models, Physica A 277(1–2), 239–247 (2000)
F. Schweitzer and J. Holyst, Modelling Collective Opinion Formation by Means of Active Brownian Particles, Eur. Phys. J. B 15, 723–742 (2000)
S. Galam, Social paradoxes of majority rule voting and renormalization group, J. Stat. Phys 61, 943–951 (1990)
S. Galam, Real space renormalization group and totalitarian paradox of majority rule voting, Physica A 285, 66–76 (2000)
S. Galam, Rational group decision making: a random field Ising model at T = 0, Physica A 238, 66–80 (1997)
S. Galam, B. Chopard, A. Masselot and M. Droz, Competing Species, Dynamics Eur. Phys. J. B 4 529–531 (1998)
B. Chopard, M. Droz and S Galam, An evolution theory in finite size systems, Eur. Phys. J. B 16 575–578 (2000)
S. Galam, Minority Opinion Spreading in Random Geometry, Eur. Phys. J. B 25, Rapid Note, 403–406 (2002)
S. Galam, The September 11 attack: A percolation of individual passive support, Eur. Phys. J. B 26, Rapid Note, 269–272 (2002)
S. Galam Fragmentation versus stability in bimodal coalitions, Physica A230, 174–188 (1996)
R. Axelrod and D. S. Bennett A landscape theory of aggregation, British J. Political Sciences 23, 211–233 (1993)
S. Galam, Comment on A landscape theory of aggregation, British J. Political Sciences 28, 411–412 (1998)
K. Binder and A. P. Young, Spin glasses: experimental facts, theoretical concepts, and open questions, Review of Modern Physics 58, 801–911 (1986)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Galam, S. (2002). Spontaneous Coalition Forming. Why Some Are Stable?. In: Bandini, S., Chopard, B., Tomassini, M. (eds) Cellular Automata. ACRI 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2493. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45830-1_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45830-1_1
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-44304-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45830-2
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive