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Protocol Engineering Applied to Formal Analysis of Security Systems

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Infrastructure Security (InfraSec 2002)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2437))

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Abstract

Every communication system requiring security properties is certainly critical. In order to study the security of communication systems, we have developed a methodology for the application of the formal analysis techniques of communication protocols to the analysis of cryptographic ones. We have extended the design and analysis phases with security properties. Our methodology uses a specification technique based on the HMSC/MSC requirement languages, and translates it into a generic schema for the SDL specification language, which is used for the analysis. Thus, the technique allows the specification of security protocols using a standard formal language and uses Object-Orientation for reusability purposes. The final goal is not only the formal specification of a security system, but to examine the possible attacks, and later use the specification in more complex systems.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Department, University of Malaga, Spain

    Javier Lopez, Juan J. Ortega & Jose M. Troya

Authors
  1. Javier Lopez
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  2. Juan J. Ortega
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  3. Jose M. Troya
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 53201, Milwaukee, WI, USA

    George Davida

  2. TechTegrity LLC, P.O. Box 2125, 07091, Westfield, NJ, USA

    Yair Frankel

  3. Hewlett-Packard Laboratories, Filton Road, Stoke Gifford, BS34 8QZ, Bristol, UK

    Owen Rees

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© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Lopez, J., Ortega, J.J., Troya, J.M. (2002). Protocol Engineering Applied to Formal Analysis of Security Systems. In: Davida, G., Frankel, Y., Rees, O. (eds) Infrastructure Security. InfraSec 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2437. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45831-X_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45831-X_17

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-44309-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45831-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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