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Choice Logic Programs and Nash Equilibria in Strategic Games

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Computer Science Logic (CSL 1999)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 1683))

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Abstract

We define choice logic programs as negation-free datalog programs that allow rules to have exclusive-only disjunctions in the head. We show that choice programs are equivalent to semi-negative datalog programs, at least as far as stable models are concerned. We also discuss an application where strategic games can be naturally formulated as choice programs; it turns out that the stable models of such programs capture exactly the set of Nash equilibria.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Computer Science, Free University of Brussels, VUB Pleinlaan 2, Brussels, 1050, Belgium

    Marina De Vos & Dirk Vermeir

Authors
  1. Marina De Vos
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  2. Dirk Vermeir
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Mathematisches Institut, Universität Freiburg, Eckerstr. 1, D-79104, Freiburg, Germany

    Jörg Flum

  2. Dpto. de Sistemas Informáticos y Programación Edificio Fac. Matemáticas, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Av. Complutense s/n, E-28040, Madrid, Spain

    Mario Rodriguez-Artalejo

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© 1999 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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De Vos, M., Vermeir, D. (1999). Choice Logic Programs and Nash Equilibria in Strategic Games. In: Flum, J., Rodriguez-Artalejo, M. (eds) Computer Science Logic. CSL 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1683. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48168-0_19

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48168-0_19

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-66536-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-48168-3

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