Abstract
When attacking a distributed protocol, an adaptive adversary is able to decide its actions (e.g., which parties to corrupt) at any time based on its entire view of the protocol including the entire communication history. Proving security of cryptographic protocols against adaptive adversaries is a fundamental problem in cryptography. In this paper we consider “distributed public-key systems” which are secure against an adaptive adversary.
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Frankel, Y., MacKenzie, P., Yung, M. (1999). Adaptively-Secure Distributed Public-Key Systems. In: Nešetřil, J. (eds) Algorithms - ESA’ 99. ESA 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1643. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48481-7_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48481-7_2
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