Abstract
This paper is motivated by a study of the mechanism used to assign primary school students in Singapore to secondary schools. The assignment process requires that primary school students submit a rank ordered list of six schools to the Ministry of Education. Students are then assigned to secondary schools based on their preferences, with priority going to those with the highest examination scores on the Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE). The current matching mechanism is plagued by several problems, and a satisfactory resolution of these problems necessitates the use of a stable matching mechanism. In fact, the student-optimal and school-optimal matching mechanisms of Gale and Shapley [2] are natural candidates.
Research supported by a NUS Research grant RP 3970021.
Research supported by an IBM Fellowship.
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Teo, CP., Sethuraman, J., Tan, WP. (1999). Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues and Applications (Extended Abstract). In: Cornuéjols, G., Burkard, R.E., Woeginger, G.J. (eds) Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization. IPCO 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1610. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48777-8_32
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48777-8_32
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