Abstract
This paper describes how a state emerges and collapses that makes it possible for citizens to do something which they will not do voluntarily. The model is a generalisation of the multi-stage game of Okada and Sakakibara (1991). The general model, its mathematical analysis with condition for simplicity and simulations for more general cases are presented. The results of simulations suggest that selfish but rational people may agree to make a state, which grows as the public capital stock accumulates but collapses when the stock reaches a certain level.
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Okada, A. and Sakakibara, K.: The emergence of the state: A game theoretic approach to the theory of social contract, Economic Studies Quarterly, vol.42,no.4 (1991)
Davis, D.D. and Holt, C.H.: Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press (1993)
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© 1999 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Iwasaki, A., Oda, S.H., Ueda, K. (1999). Simulating a N-person Multi-stage Game for Making a State. In: McKay, B., Yao, X., Newton, C.S., Kim, JH., Furuhashi, T. (eds) Simulated Evolution and Learning. SEAL 1998. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 1585. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48873-1_40
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48873-1_40
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