Abstract
Frequently, inventors of an attack desperately try to find reasons why the victim of the attack should have initiated a protocol run with an intruder when it is blatantly obvious that there is no intruder anywhere to be seen but there is a misbehaving insider. Security models where the antagonist is an insider are much more relevant to the electronic commerce scenario which today drives much work on security protocols and cryptography. This is another example of a general problem in security. Too often, the concepts used to discuss security do not fit the security issues we are trying to address.
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Gollmann, D. (1998). Insider Fraud. In: Christianson, B., Crispo, B., Harbison, W.S., Roe, M. (eds) Security Protocols. Security Protocols 1998. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1550. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-49135-X_29
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-49135-X_29
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