Abstract
Recently [1], Biham and Shamir announced an attack (Differential Fault Analysis, DFA for short) that recovers keys of arbitrary cryptosystems in polynomial (quadratic) complexity. In this paper, we show that under slightly modified assumptions, DFA is not polynomial and would simply result in the loss of some key-bits. Additionally, we prove the existence of cryptosystems on which DFA cannot reach the announced workfactor.
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© 1999 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Paillier, P. (1999). Evaluating Differential Fault Analysis of Unknown Cryptosystems. In: Public Key Cryptography. PKC 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1560. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-49162-7_19
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-49162-7_19
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