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A Secure Pay-per-View Scheme for Web-Based Video Service

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Public Key Cryptography (PKC 1999)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 1560))

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Abstract

With the development of high speed computer networks, video service on the Web has huge market potential in that the video service can be provided to subscribers with greater time and schedule flexibility compared to the current cable TV system. Under the pay-per-view (PPV) scheme, subscribers only need to pay for the programs that they have watched. A critical issue on PPV service is the capability of settling disputes over PPV service charges. This is especially important in the case that the Internet communication could be interrupted (by accident or deliberately) in the middle of a viewing session. This paper proposes a fair PPV billing protocol for web-based video service. With this protocol, a video service will be divided into small units, and a subscriber needs to submit cryptographic evidence which enables fair billing based on the number of units being provided in a viewing session. In addition, by the establishment of a one-way sequential link, the validity of evidence is maintained efficiently without any involvement of trusted third parties. Our scheme is light-weighted in terms of the storage requirement and computation overheads on subscribers, thus subscribers can request PPV service securely with their own smart cards regardless of their physical location.

The research towards this paper was funded by the National Science and Technology Board of Singapore, and was conducted in the School of Computing, National University of Singapore.

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© 1999 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Zhou, J., Lam, K.Y. (1999). A Secure Pay-per-View Scheme for Web-Based Video Service. In: Public Key Cryptography. PKC 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1560. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-49162-7_25

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-49162-7_25

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-65644-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-49162-0

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