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Compositionality and omniscience in situation semantics

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Natural Language Processing (EAIA 1990)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 476))

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Abstract

We have defined the syntax and semantics for the language Determiner-Free Aliass of Barwise and Perry using a compositional definition in the same style of MS. The interpretation of a sentence is defined as a constraint on situations and required to be computationally expressed. A situation is a finite collection of facts about the world. The notion of statement, the utterance of an indicative sentence, is defined as a pair of an uttering situation and a sentence. The notion of equality of meaning for statements is modeled or formalized with the concept of strong equivalence between statements. We showed that in general such semantics can suffer from the problem of omniscience. However, if we restrict ourselves to real and computable interpretations, where we avoid strict synonymity and quantification of the interpretation on the definition of equivalence, we may avoid that problem. We believe that this solution could be used both for Situation Semantics and for possible-worlds semantics, or alternatively that this would be used as a distinguishing characteristic for the former semantics. We also commented on Hintikka's formal semantics for propositional attitudes, and we noticed that his attempt to make the use of knowledge mathematically objective, always creates omniscience.

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  1. We could reject this particular equivalence, as arising from strict implication. The use of a system which avoids the so-called ‘paradoxes of strict implication’ could stop this particular equivalence (see for instance in [Hughes and Cresswell, 1968] system E). However, the argument rests on any logical equivalence, and any formal system should provide some kind of equivalence.

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  2. For non-normal modal logics see [Hughes and Cresswell, 1968], for instance the modal systems S1, S2 and S3, which do not have the rule of necessitation.

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  3. “[...] After all, logical equivalence is logical equivalence, isn′t it ? But is it ?” ([Barwise, 1981]), pp. 388).

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  4. Synonym. 1. Strictly, a word having the same sense as another (in the same language); but more usu., either of any two or more words (in the same language) having the same general sense, but possessing each of them meanings which are not shared by the other or others, or having different shades of meaning appropriate to different contexts [...]. 2. By extension: A name or expression which involves or implies a meaning properly or literally expressed by some other [...]. The Shorter OED on Historical Principles, Third Edition 1944, Vol II, ©OUP 1973, (1986 reprint), pps. 1279–2672. Formally, the notion of strict synonymity is treated as equality of meaning; for instance as logical equivalence for sentences. The notion of non-strict synonymity seems to be captured for instance in S&A's notion of strong equivalence for statements, utterances of sentences. We believe it could be extended to utterances of words. In this case we would require that the interpretation of synonyms must be somehow different with different contexts, apart from words which are, or are imposed to be, strict synonyms. The interpretation u of the language for two different words is equal, exactly when (iff) they strictly are synonyms (when those two words have always the same meaning). If I allow strict synonymity between expressions in my formalization then, as we will see, I will have to accept all the consequences of that decision. In S&A the notion of synonymy is never explicitly referred to.

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M. Filgueiras L. Damas N. Moreira A. P. Tomás

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© 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Falcão e Cunha, J. (1991). Compositionality and omniscience in situation semantics. In: Filgueiras, M., Damas, L., Moreira, N., Tomás, A.P. (eds) Natural Language Processing. EAIA 1990. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 476. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-53678-7_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-53678-7_9

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-53678-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-46975-9

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