Abstract
Secure commitment is a primitive enabling information hiding, which is one of the most basic tools in cryptography. Specifically, it is a two-party partial-information game between a “committer” and a “receiver”, in which a secure envelope is first implemented and later opened. The committer has a bit in mind which he commits to by putting it in a “secure envelope”. The receiver cannot guess what the value is until the opening stage and the committer can not change his mind once committed.
Supported by IBM Graduate Fellowship. Part of this work done while at IBM T.J. Watson Research Center.
Part of the work done at Boston University supported by NSF-CCR9015276.
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Ostrovsky, R., Venkatesan, R., Yung, M. (1992). Secure commitment against a powerful adversary. In: Finkel, A., Jantzen, M. (eds) STACS 92. STACS 1992. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 577. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-55210-3_203
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