Skip to main content

Arguments and mental models: A position paper

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Practical Reasoning (FAPR 1996)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 1085))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

This paper explores the relationship between arguments and mental models in the context of practical reasoning. Argument-models are distinguished from other kinds of mental model, in particular causal models. Examples of both kinds are presented. In addition, the process of constructing a mental model is distinguished from the process of resolving the model in order to reach a decision. It is suggested that argumentationmodels are especially important in social situations whereas causal models may be more relevant when an individual has to make a number of interrelated decisions. The representation relevant to decision and action differs in these two cases as does the nature of the resolution process. Some experimental and empirical work is discussed which illustrates the proposal.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Antaki, C. (1994). Explaining and arguing: The Social Organization of Accounts. London: Sage Publications.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baron, J. Myside bias in thinking about abortion. Thinking and Reasoning, 1, 221–235.

    Google Scholar 

  • Billig, M. (1987). Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brothers, L. (1990). The social brain: A project for integrating primate behavior and neurophysiology in a new domain. Concepts in NeuroScience, 1, 27–51.

    Google Scholar 

  • Byrne, R., & Whitten, A. (1988). Machiavellian Intelligence: social expertise and the evolution of intellect in monkeys, apes and humans. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cosmides, L., Tooby, J., & Barkow, J. (1992). Introduction:evolutionary psychology and conceptual integration. In J.Barkow et al. The Adapted Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Craik, K. (1943). The Nature of Explanation. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Curley, S.P., Browne, G.J., Smith, G.F., & Benson, P.G. (1995) Arguments in practical reasoning underlying constructed probability responses. Journal of Behavioral Decision-Making, 8, 1–20.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dunbar, R. (1993). Coevolution of neocortical size, group size, and language in humans. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16, 681–735.

    Google Scholar 

  • Edwards, D., & Potter, J. (1993). Language and causation: a discursive action model of description and attribution. Psychological Review, 100, 23–41.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fox, J. (1994). On the necessity of probability: reasons to believe and grounds for doubt. In G.Wright & P. Ayton (Eds.). Subjective Probability. John Wiley & Sons.

    Google Scholar 

  • Green, D.W. (1994). Induction: representation, strategy and argument. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 8, 45–50.

    Google Scholar 

  • Green, D.W. (1995). Explaining and envisaging an ecological phenomenon. British Journal of Psychology (in press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Green, D.W. (1996) Inferring health claims: a case study. Forensic Linguistics (in press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Green, D.W., & McManus, I.C. (1995). Cognitive structural models: the perception of risk and prevention in coronary heart disease. British Journal of Psychology, 86, 321–336.

    PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Green, D.W., Muckli, L., & McClelland, A. (1995). Argument and decision. Paper presented to the British Psychological Society Cognitive Psychology Section Meeting, Bristol, September 7–9, 1995.

    Google Scholar 

  • Huff, A.S. (1991) Ed. Mapping strategic thought. New York: John Wiley & Sons

    Google Scholar 

  • Humphrey, N. (1984). Consciousness Regained. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1983). Mental models: Towards a Cognitive Science of Language, Inference and Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1993). Human and Machine Thinking. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1994). A model theory of induction. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 8, 5–29.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson-Laird, P.N., Byrne, R.M.J., & Schaeken, W. (1992). Prepositional reasoning by model. Psychological Review, 99, 418–439.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Jungermann, H., and Thuring, M. (1987). The use of mental models for generating scenarios. In G.Wright and P. Ayton (eds.). Judgemental Forecasting. London: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

    Google Scholar 

  • Keynes, J.M. (1921). Treatise on probability. London: Macmillan & Co.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuhn, D. (1991). The Skills of Argument. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., & Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1993). Focusing in reasoning and decision-making. Cognition, 49, 37–66.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Loui, R-P. (1991). Argument and belief: where we stand in the Keynesian tradition. Minds and Machines, 1, 357–365.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Macrae, C.N. (1992). A tale of two curries: counter-factual thinking and accident-related judgements. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18, 84–87.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mason, R.O. & Mitroff, I.I.. (1981). Challenging strategic planning assumptions: theory, cases and techniques. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pennington, N., & Hastie, R. (1993). Reasoning in explanation-based decision-making. Cognition, 49, 123–163.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Perkins, D.N. (1989). Reasoning as it is and could be: an empirical perspective. In D.M. Topping, D.C. Crowell, & V.N. Kobayashi (Eds.). Thinking across cultures: the third international conference on thinking. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, cited in Baron (1995).

    Google Scholar 

  • Pollock, J. (1991). Self-defeating arguments. Minds and Machines, 1, 367–392.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pollock, J. (1992). New foundations for practical reasoning. Minds and Machines, 2, 113–144.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pollock, J. (1993). The phylogeny of rationality. Cognitive Science, 17, 563–588.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Toulmin, S. (1958). The Uses of Argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vygotsky, L.S. (1960). The development of higher mental functions. Quoted in J.V. Wertsch (1985). Vygotsky and the Social Formation of Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Dov M. Gabbay Hans Jürgen Ohlbach

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Green, D.W. (1996). Arguments and mental models: A position paper. In: Gabbay, D.M., Ohlbach, H.J. (eds) Practical Reasoning. FAPR 1996. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1085. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-61313-7_112

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-61313-7_112

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-61313-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-68454-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics