Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to show that the appropriate account of moral reasons will be somewhere between extreme generalism and extreme particularism. Results from research in Parallel Distributed Processing will be used to show how moral knowledge may be thought of as general but not productively thought of in terms of exceptionless rules.
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
Bibliography
Churchland, Paul. A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science. Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, Bradford Book, 1989.
Dancy, Jonathan. Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.
McClelland, J.L., D.E. Rumelhart. Explorations in Parallel Distributed Processing. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, Bradford Book, 1988.
Smolensky, Paul. “Neural and Conceptual Interpretation of PDP Models,” in J.L. McClelland, D.E. Rumelhart, and the PDP Research Group. Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition, vol. 2. Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, Bradford Book, 1986.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. “A Defense of Abortion,” in The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion, eds. M.T. Cohen, T. Nagel, and T. Scanlon. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Guarini, M. (1996). Mind, morals, and reasons. In: Gabbay, D.M., Ohlbach, H.J. (eds) Practical Reasoning. FAPR 1996. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1085. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-61313-7_81
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-61313-7_81
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-61313-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-68454-1
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive