Keywords and Synonyms
Strategyproof; Truthful; Nash; BB
Problem Definition
This problem is concerned with the multicast routing and cost sharing in a selfish network composed of relay terminals and receivers. This problem is motivated by the recent observation that the selfish behavior of the network could largely degraded existing system performance, even dysfunction. The work of Wang, Li and Chu [7] first presented some negative results of the strategyproof mechanism in multicast routing and sharing, and then proposed a new solution based on Nash Equilibrium that could greatly improve the performance.
Wang, Li and Chu modeled a network by a link weighted graph \( { G=(V,E,\textbf{c}) } \), where V is the set of all nodes and \( { \textbf{c} } \) is the cost vector of the set E of links. For a multicast session, let Q denote the set of all receivers. In game theoretical networking literatures, usually there are two models for the multicast cost/payment sharing.
Axiom Model (AM)All...
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Recommended Reading
Feigenbaum, J., Papadimitriou, C.H., Shenker, S.: Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 63, 21–41 (2001)
Kao, M.-Y., Li, X.-Y., Wang, W.: Towards truthful mechanisms for binary demand games: A general framework. In: ACM EC, pp. 213–222, Vancouver, Canada (2005)
Herzog, S., Shenker, S., Estrin, D.: Sharing the “cost” of multicast trees: an axiomatic analysis. IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw. 5, 847–860 (1997)
Moulin, H., Shenker, S.: Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency. Econ. Theory 18, 511–533 (2001)
Wang, W., Li, X.-Y., Sun, Z., Wang, Y.: Design multicast protocols for non-cooperative networks. In: Proceedings of the 24th IEEE INFOCOM. vol. 3, pp. 1596–1607, Miami, USA (2005)
Wang, W., Li, X.-Y., Wang, Y.: Truthful multicast in selfish wireless networks. In: Proceedings of the 10th ACM MOBICOM, pp. 245–259, Philadelphia, USA (2004)
Wang, W., Li, X.-Y., Chu, X.: Nash equilibria, dominant strategies in routing. In: Workshop for Internet and Network Economics (WINE). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3828, pp 979–988. Springer, Hong Kong, China (2005)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2008 Springer-Verlag
About this entry
Cite this entry
Wang, W., Li, XY., Chu, X. (2008). Nash Equilibria and Dominant Strategies in Routing. In: Kao, MY. (eds) Encyclopedia of Algorithms. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-30162-4_254
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-30162-4_254
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-0-387-30770-1
Online ISBN: 978-0-387-30162-4
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceReference Module Computer Science and Engineering