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Intentionality: A Naturalization Proposal on the Basis of Complex Dynamical Systems

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Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science

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Definition of the Subject

In the philosophical and psychological tradition, intentionality is viewed as a characterizing property of mental (cognitive) acts. Mental acts have content, i. e. they ‘are about something’. This something is called the intentional object. Intentionality may take the form of a desired state (as in, “I wish it were Friday.”) or a goal (e. g., my plan for a weekend trip to the mountains). When viewing the constituents of the mind (the cognitive system) in this intentionalist manner, we stand in stark contrast to scientific descriptions of physical systems. These latter systems are material things, which are sufficiently described without reference to objects they would be about, or to states they might desire to realize. Therefore, are mental and physical systems qualitatively different with respect to intentionality? If yes, we are confronted with a dualist worldview entailing an aggravated mind–body problem . If no,...

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Abbreviations

Cognition:

A general concept of psychology referring to all processes and structures of the mind. These comprise the processing of stimulus ‘input’ (i. e., perception) and the internal processing of represented information (e. g., memory functions, thinking, problem solving); the latter processes presuppose intentional features of the mind. Cognitive structures include knowledge, categories, memory, attitudes, and schemata, again intentional concepts.

Dynamical systems theory:

A system is any set of things (components, elements) that stand in relation to one another. If a rule or description exists that defines how the systems change over time (such as a differential equation or a mapping algorithm), the system is a dynamical system.

Intentionality:

A characterizing property of the mind. In contrast to physical systems, mental states have content, i. e. they ‘are about something’ in the sense that they contain a reference to an object, or the representation of an object. In addition to aboutness, intentionality demands a functional reference to the intentional object.

Mind–body problem:

The philosophical question as to if and how mind and brain/body interact. Analogously, the question if mental processes and physical processes are ontologically different.

Naturalization:

Explaining mental phenomena using concepts and models derived from the natural sciences. Naturalization efforts may be viewed as tools in order to develop viable simulation models of mental processes.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland

    Wolfgang Tschacher

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  1. Wolfgang Tschacher
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. RAMTECH LIMITED, 122 Escalle Lane, Larkspur, CA, 94939, USA

    Robert A. Meyers Ph. D. (Editor-in-Chief) (Editor-in-Chief)

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Tschacher, W. (2009). Intentionality: A Naturalization Proposal on the Basis of Complex Dynamical Systems. In: Meyers, R. (eds) Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-30440-3_290

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