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Moral Dynamics

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Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science

Definition of the Subject

Moral dynamics refers to the processes and phenomena (collective or individual) by which moral behavior and moralattitudes emerge, evolve, spread, erode or disappear. Moral attitudes are broadly conceived and meant to include thewhole internal side of morality: internalized norms, accepted values, guiding virtues, certain types of moraldispositions or morally transformed preferences, feelings like guild, regret and shame. Moral behavior regards the moreexternal and at least partially observable side of morality: Certain types of actions or omissions in certainsituations in which, for instance, prescriptions or proscriptions apply.

Especially in large‐scale societies with a high frequency of anonymous interactions there are lots of situations with an inherentincentive to cheat, to betray, to be unfair etc. – i. e. to act in a way that almost everybody considers to be immoral. Oftenexternal and formal inspection, control and enforcement by central authorities...

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Abbreviations

Evolutionary game theory :

Evolutionary game theory was developed as a transfer of traditional game theory to biological contexts. Payoffs are no longer interpreted as representing preferences over outcomes. In evolutionary game theory payoffs represent fitness. A central idea is that strategies replicate according to their performance in terms of fitness. More successful strategies become more frequent, less successful become less frequent. Evolutionary game theory focuses on the success driven frequency dynamics of strategies that are played in a population. The rationality assumptions of traditional game theory are given up.

Game theory :

Game theory studies strategic interactions among rational players. They have preferences over all possible outcomes of their interaction, i. e. the game that is played. Given their preferences all players try to make the best out of the situations, knowing that all others are doing that as well. A central question is: Given the possible strategies and given the preferences, what combination of strategies, one for each player, would be a solution of a game among rational players? John von Neumann, Oskar Morgenstern and John Nash took decisive first steps in the 1940s to develop the theory.

Moral dynamics :

Moral dynamics refers to the processes by which moral behavior and moral attitudes emerge, evolve, spread, erode or disappear. Moral attitudes is broadly conceived and meant to include the whole internal side of morality: internalized norms, accepted values, guiding virtues, certain types of moral dispositions or morally transformed preferences, feelings like guild, regret and shame. Moral behavior regards the more external and at least partially observable side of morality.

The study of moral dynamics normally focuses on very basic problems in human interactions about which almost everybody would say that – from a moral point of view – a certain type of behavior or attitude is preferable: co‐operating if there is an incentive for free riding, sharing if there is an incentive to be greedy, reciprocating if there is an incentive not to do so. The essential structure of these ‘morally critical’ situations can be precisely described and analyzed by means of traditional and evolutionary game theory.

Nash equilibrium:

The Nash equilibrium is the central solution concept in game theory. A Nash equilibrium is a combination of strategies, one for each player, in which each player’s strategy is a best response to the others’ strategies. As a consequence, if all others play their equilibrium strategy, then no one has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from the equilibrium strategy.

Replicator dynamics :

The replicator dynamics is a fundamental concept in evolutionary game theory: Strategies that beat the average success, become more frequent; strategies that perform below average become less frequent. The replicator dynamics can be both, a biological process that involves genes, and a cultural process that involves imitation.

Social contract :

The notion of a social contract became famous by Hobbes’ Leviathan: In a state of nature, in which life is nasty, brutish and short, the individuals design and sign a contract to establish a central enforcement agency that guarantees societal peace. Nowadays the meaning of social contract is often a bit different: What is meant is a set of fundamental moral arrangements that make societal life possible altogether – for instance, keeping promises, dividing fair, doing one’s part and so on.

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  1. Institute of Philosophy, Bayreuth University, Bayreuth, Germany

    Rainer Hegselmann

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    Robert A. Meyers Ph. D. (Editor-in-Chief) (Editor-in-Chief)

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Hegselmann, R. (2009). Moral Dynamics. In: Meyers, R. (eds) Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-30440-3_338

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