Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

System Dynamics Philosophical Background and Underpinnings

  • Reference work entry
Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science

Definition of the Subject

We all tend to take things for granted. Indeed it is a common place to judge formal models exclusively based on the technical grounds and onthe logic with which those models were built without a proper reflection on the assumptions underlying those models. This omission is even morepressing in complexity and system science, since these areas represent a novel challenge for philosophers of science – e. g. see anoverview in [34].

What is the idea of reality with which we work? What do we assume about human nature? What kind of knowledge do we pursue? What kind of knowledge dowe obtain? What is the scope of rational inquiry? What are the basis and the implications of our own reasoning methods? The identification of howphilosophy has shaped the work of scientists – on a conscious or unconscious level – is essential for comprehending theimplications, the limitations, and the scope of our very scientific practice. The lack of concern by scientists for these issues...

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution

Institutional subscriptions

Abbreviations

Philosophy:

The reflection and study of our most basic assumptions – or the assumptions themselves.

Mental model:

A mental image of selected concepts and relationships of the world around us which we consider relevant for explaining the behavior of a particular system.

Presentationalism:

Synonymous of idealism. The view that material objects or external realities do not exist apart from our knowledge or consciousness of them.

Bibliography

  1. Aronson JL (1988) Testing for Convergent Realism. PSA: Proceedings of theBiennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, vol One: Contributed Papers. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 188–193

    Google Scholar 

  2. Axelrod R (1997) Advancing the art of simulation in the social science. In:Conte R, Hegselmann R, Terna P (eds) Simulating Social Phenomena. Springer, Berlin, pp 21–40

    Google Scholar 

  3. Barlas Y, Carpenter S (1990) Philosophical roots of model validation: twoparadigms. Syst Dyn Rev 6:148–166

    Google Scholar 

  4. Bartley III WW (1987) Philosophy of biology versus philosophy of physics. In:Radnitzky G, Bartley III WW (eds) Evolutionary epistemology, rationality, and the sociology of knowledge. Open Court, La Salle, pp7–45

    Google Scholar 

  5. Bechtel W, Richardson RC (1993) Discovering complexity: Decomposition andlocalization as strategies in scientific research. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  6. Benjamin AC (1941) Modes of scientific explanation. Philos Sci8:486–492

    Google Scholar 

  7. Berger R (1998) Understanding science: Why causes are not enough. Philos Sci65:306–332

    Google Scholar 

  8. Berkeley G (1948–1957) The works of George Berkeley, Bishop ofCloyne. Thomas Nelson and Sons, London

    Google Scholar 

  9. Black M (1934) The principle of verifiability. Analysis2:1–6

    Google Scholar 

  10. Blackmore J (1979) On the inverted use of the terms ‘Realism’ and‘Idealism’ among scientists and historians of science. Br J Philos Sci 30:125–134

    Google Scholar 

  11. Bowman AA (1916) Kant's phenomenalism in its relation to subsequentmetaphysics. Mind, New Ser 25:461–489

    Google Scholar 

  12. Brandon RN (1984) Grene on mechanism and reductionism: more than justa side issue. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, vol II: Symposia and Invited Papers. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 345–353

    Google Scholar 

  13. Brown HI (1990) Cherniak on scientific realism. Br J Philos Sci41:415–427

    Google Scholar 

  14. Burrell G, Morgan G (1979) Sociological paradigms and organizationalanalysis. Heinemann, London

    Google Scholar 

  15. Chapin JP (1941) Idealism and its relation to science. Philosophy of Science8:142–146

    Google Scholar 

  16. Checkland P, Pidd M, Morecroft J (2004) Working ideas, insights for systemsmodeling: The Broader community of systems thinkers. In: Kennedy M, Winch G, Langer R, Rowe J, Yanni J (eds)Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference of the System Dynamics Society, Keble College, University of Oxford, England. System Dynamics Society, Albany

    Google Scholar 

  17. Coyle G (2000) Qualitative and quantitative modelling in system dynamics: someresearch questions. Syst Dyn Rev 16:225–244

    MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  18. Coyle RG (1979) Management system dynamics. Wiley,Chichester

    Google Scholar 

  19. Deetz S (1996) Describing differences in approaches to organization science:Rethinking Burrell and Morgan and their legacy. Organ Sci 7:191–207

    Google Scholar 

  20. Dickson M (1995) An empirical reply to empiricism: Protective measurementsopens the door for quantum realism. Philos Sci 62:122–140

    Google Scholar 

  21. Doyle JK, Ford DN (1998) Mental models concepts for system dynamicsresearch. Syst Dyn Rev 14:3–29

    Google Scholar 

  22. Doyle JK, Ford DN (1999) Mental models concepts revisited: some clarificationsand a reply to Lane. Syst Dyn Rev 15:411–415

    Google Scholar 

  23. Flood R, Jackson M (1991) Creative problem solving. Wiley,Chichester

    Google Scholar 

  24. Forrester JW (1961) Industrial Dynamics. Press MIT,Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  25. Forrester JW (1971) Principles of Systems. Wright‐Allen Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  26. Forrester JW (1975) Counterintuitive behavior of social systems. In: Collectedpapers of Jay W. Forrester. Wright‐Allen Press, Cambridge, pp 211–244

    Google Scholar 

  27. Forrester JW (1975) Industrial Dynamics: A Major breakthrough fordecision makers. In: Collected papers of Jay W Forrester. Wright‐Allen Press, Cambridge, pp 1–29

    Google Scholar 

  28. Forrester JW (1975) Industrial Dynamics – After the firstdecade. In: Collected papers of Jay W. Forrester. Wright‐Allen Press, Cambridge, pp 133–150

    Google Scholar 

  29. Forrester JW (1985) “The” model versus a modeling“process”. Syst Dyn Rev 1:133–134

    Google Scholar 

  30. Forrester JW (1987) Lessons from system dynamics modeling. Syst Dyn Rev3:136–149

    Google Scholar 

  31. Forrester JW (1994) System dynamics, systems thinking, and soft OR. Syst DynRev 10:245–256

    Google Scholar 

  32. Forrester JW (2003) Dynamic models of economic systems and industrialorganizations. Syst Dyn Rev 19:331–345

    Google Scholar 

  33. Fuller S (1994) Retrieving the point of the realism‐instrumentalismdebate: Mach vs. Planck on science education policy. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, vol One:Contributed Papers. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 200–208

    Google Scholar 

  34. Gershenson C, Aerts D, Edmonds B (2007) Worldviews, science and us. Philosophyand complexity. World Scientific, Singapore

    Google Scholar 

  35. Gilbert N, Troitzsch KG (1999) Simulation for the social scientist. OpenUniversity Press, Buckingham

    Google Scholar 

  36. Glennan SS (2002) Rethinking mechanistic explanation. Philos Sci69:342–353

    Google Scholar 

  37. Guyer P (1983) Kant's intentions in the refutation of idealism. Philos Rev92:329–383

    Google Scholar 

  38. Hayek FA (1955) Degrees of explanation. Br J Philos Sci6:209–225

    Google Scholar 

  39. Hayek FA (1942) Scientism and the study of society, Part I. Economica, New Ser9:267–291

    Google Scholar 

  40. Hayek FA (1943) Scientism and the study of society, Part II. Economica, NewSer 10:34–63

    Google Scholar 

  41. Hempel CG, Oppenheim P (1948) Studies in the logic of explanation. Philos Sci15:135–175

    Google Scholar 

  42. Hesslow G (1981) Causality and determinism. Philos Sci48:591–605

    MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  43. Hitchcock CR, Salmon WC (2000) Statistical explanation. In: Newton‐SmithWH (ed) A Companion to the philosophy of science. Blackwell Publishers, Malden, pp 470–479

    Google Scholar 

  44. Homer JB (1996) Why we iterate: scientific modeling in theory andpractice. Syst Dyn Rev 12:1–19

    Google Scholar 

  45. Hume D (1740) A treatise of human nature. Oxford University Press,Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  46. Humphreys P (2000) Causation. In: Newton‐Smith WH (ed) A companionto the philosophy of science. Blackwell Publishers, Malden, pp 31–40

    Google Scholar 

  47. Hunter B (1992) Empiricism. In: Dancy J, Sosa E (eds) A Companion toEpistemology. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, pp 110–115

    Google Scholar 

  48. Jackson M (1991) Systems methodology for the management sciences. PlenumPress, New York

    Google Scholar 

  49. Jackson M (2003) Systems thinking: Creative holism for managers. Wiley, Chichester

    Google Scholar 

  50. Jobe EK (1985) Explanation, causality, and counterfactuals. Philos Sci52:357–389

    MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  51. Kleindorfer GB, Ganeshan R (1993) The philosophy of science and validation insimulation. In: Evans GW, Mollaghasemi M, Russell EC, Biles WE (eds) Proceedings of the 1993 Winter Simulation Conference. IEEE, Piscataway, pp50–57

    Google Scholar 

  52. Kukla A (1995) Scientific realism and theoretical unification. Analysis55:230–238

    MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  53. Lane D (1994) With a little help from our friends: How system dynamicsand soft OR can learn from each other. Syst Dyn Rev 10:101–134

    Google Scholar 

  54. Lane D (1999) Friendly amendment: A commentary on Doyle and Ford'sproposed re‐definition of ‘mental model’. Syst Dyn Rev 15:185–194

    Google Scholar 

  55. Lane D (2000) Should system dynamics be described as a ‘Hard’ or‘Deterministic’ systems approach? Syst Res Behav Sci 17:3–22

    Google Scholar 

  56. Lane D (2001) Rerum cognoscere causas: Part I – How do the ideas ofsystem dynamics relate to traditional social theories and the voluntarism/determinism debate? Syst Dyn Rev 17:97–118

    Google Scholar 

  57. Lane D (2001) Rerum cognoscere causas: Part II – Opportunitiesgenerated by the agency/structure debate and suggestions for clarifying the social theoretic position of system dynamics. Syst Dyn Rev17:293–309

    Google Scholar 

  58. Lane D, Smart C (1996) Reinterpreting ‘generic structure’:evolution, application and limitations of a concept. Syst Dyn Rev 12:87–120

    Google Scholar 

  59. Leplin J (1992) Realism and Methodological Change. PSA: Proceedings of theBiennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, vol Two: Symposia and Invited Papers. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 435–445

    Google Scholar 

  60. Leplin J (2000) Realism and Instrumentalism. In: Newton‐Smith WH (ed)A Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Blackwell Publishers, Malden, pp 393–401

    Google Scholar 

  61. Luna-Reyes LF, Andersen DL (2003) Collecting and analyzing qualitative datafor system dynamics: methods and models. Syst Dyn Rev 19:271–296

    Google Scholar 

  62. Machamer P, Darden L, Craver CF (2000) Thinking about mechanisms. Philos Sci67:1–25

    MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  63. Meadows DH (1980) The Unavoidable A Priori. In: Randers J (ed) Elementsof the system dynamics method. Productivity Press, Cambridge, pp 23–57

    Google Scholar 

  64. Milford K (1994) In pursuit of rationality. A note on Hayek's TheCounter‐Revolution of Science. In: Birner J, van Zijp R (eds) Hayek, Co‐ordination and Evolution. Routledge, London,pp 323–340

    Google Scholar 

  65. Mojtahedzadeh M, Andersen D, Richardson GP (2004) Using digest to implementthe pathway participation method for detecting influential system structure. Syst Dyn Rev 20:1–20

    Google Scholar 

  66. Morrison M (1988) Reduction and realism. PSA: Proceedings of the BiennialMeeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, vol One: Contributed Papers. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 286–293

    Google Scholar 

  67. Morrison M (1990) Unification, realism and inference. Br J Philos Sci41:305–332

    Google Scholar 

  68. Newton‐Smith WH (1988) Modest realism. PSA: Proceedings of the BiennialMeeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, vol Two: Symposia and Invited Papers. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 179–189

    Google Scholar 

  69. Newton‐Smith WH (2000) Explanation. In: Newton‐Smith WH (ed)A companion to the philosophy of science. Blackwell Publishers, Malden/Oxford, pp 127–133

    Google Scholar 

  70. Newton‐Smith WH (2000) Hume. In: Newton‐Smith WH (ed)A companion to the philosophy of science. Blackwell Publishers, Malden, pp 165–168

    Google Scholar 

  71. Paich M (1985) Generic structures. Syst Dyn Rev1:126–132

    Google Scholar 

  72. Pettit P (1992) Realism. In: Dancy J, Sosa E (eds) A companion toepistemology. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, pp 420–424

    Google Scholar 

  73. Popper K (1963) Conjectures and refutations. The growth of scientificknowledge. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London

    Google Scholar 

  74. Popper K (1968) The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Hutchinson,London

    Google Scholar 

  75. Psillos S (1996) Scientific realism and the “pessimisticinduction”. Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Part I: Contributed Papers. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp S306-S314

    Google Scholar 

  76. Radnitzky G (1987) In defense of self‐applicable criticalrationalism. In: Radnitzky G, Bartley III WW (eds) Evolutionary epistemology, rationality, and the sociology of knowledge. Open Court, La Salle,pp 279–312

    Google Scholar 

  77. Rescher N (1992) Idealism. In: Dancy J, Sosa E (eds) A companion toepistemology. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, pp 187–191

    Google Scholar 

  78. Richardson GP (1991) Feedback thought in social science and systemstheory. Pegasus Communications, Waltham

    Google Scholar 

  79. Richardson GP (1996) Problems for the future of system dynamics. Syst Dyn Rev12:141–157

    Google Scholar 

  80. Richardson KA (2002) On the limits of bottom-up computer simulation: Towards a nonlinear modeling culture. In: Sprague RH Jr (ed) Proceedings of the 36th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS'03). IEEE

    Google Scholar 

  81. Roberts EB (1978) System dynamics – An introduction. In: Roberts EB(ed) Managerial applications of system dynamics. Pegasus Communications Inc., Waltham

    Google Scholar 

  82. Rohrlich F (1990) Computer simulation in the physical sciences. PSA:Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, vol Two: Symposia and Invited Papers. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 507–518

    Google Scholar 

  83. Ruben D (1990) Explaining explanation. Routledge,London

    Google Scholar 

  84. Runciman WG (1969) What is structuralism? Br J Sociol20:253–265

    Google Scholar 

  85. Russell B (1912) The problems of philosophy. Oxford University Press,Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  86. Russell B (1948) Human knowledge: Its scope and limits. Simon and Schuster,New York

    Google Scholar 

  87. Salmon W (1992) Explanation. In: Dancy J, Sosa E (eds) A companion toepistemology. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, pp 129–132

    Google Scholar 

  88. Salmon WC (2000) Logical Empiricism. In: Newton‐Smith WH (ed)A companion to the philosophy of science. Blackwell Publishers, Malden, pp 233–242

    Google Scholar 

  89. Schaffernicht M (2006) Detecting and monitoring change in models. Syst Dyn Rev22:73–88

    Google Scholar 

  90. Schlagel RH (1981) Contextualistic realism. Philos Phenomenol Res41:437–451

    Google Scholar 

  91. Sellars W (1976) Is scientific realism tenable? PSA: Proceedings of theBiennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, vol Two: Symposia and Invited Papers. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 307–334

    Google Scholar 

  92. Senge P (1990) The fifth discipline: The art and practice of the learningorganization. Doubleday, New York

    Google Scholar 

  93. Sidgwick H, Caird E (1880) Kant's refutation of idealism. Mind, New Ser5:111–115

    Google Scholar 

  94. Sinha D (1963) Phenomenology and positivism. Philos Phenomenol Res23:562–577

    Google Scholar 

  95. Smith DW (1982) The realism in perception. Noûs16:42–55

    Google Scholar 

  96. Spender J-C (1996) Making knowledge the basis of a dynamic theory of thefirm. Strateg Manag J 17:45–62

    Google Scholar 

  97. Stace WT (1944) Positivism. Mind, New Ser53:215–237

    Google Scholar 

  98. Sterman J (2000) Business dynamics. Systems thinking and modeling fora complex world. McGraw‐Hill, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  99. Tabery JG (2004) Synthesizing activities and interactions in the concept ofa mechanism. Philos Sci 71:1–15

    Google Scholar 

  100. Taube M (1937) Positivism, science, and history. J Philos34:205–210

    Google Scholar 

  101. Turbayne CM (1955) Kant's refutation of dogmatic idealism. Philos Q5:225–244

    Google Scholar 

  102. Vanderminden P (2006) System dynamics – A field of study,a methodology or both. In: Größler A, Rouwette E, Langer R, Rowe J, Yanni J (eds) 24th International Conference of The System DynamicsSociety. Radboud University Nijmegen, System Dynamics Society, Albany

    Google Scholar 

  103. Vásquez M, Liz M, Aracil J (1996) Knowledge and reality: someconceptual issues in system dynamics modeling. Syst Dyn Rev 12:21–37

    Google Scholar 

  104. Weimer W (1999) Hayek's approach to the problems of complex phenomena: anintroduction to the theoretical psychology of The Sensory Order. In: Boettke P (ed) The Legacy of Friedrich von Hayek, vol II. Edward Elgar PublishingLimited, Cheltenham, pp 200–244

    Google Scholar 

  105. Winsberg E (1999) Sanctioning models: The epistemology of simulation. SciContext 12:275–293

    Google Scholar 

  106. Winsberg E (2003) Simulated experiments: Methodology for a virtualworld. Philos Sci 70:105–125

    Google Scholar 

  107. Winsberg E (2001) Simulations, models, and theories: Complex physicalsystems and their representations. Philos Sci 68:S442–S454

    Google Scholar 

  108. Wolstenholme EF (1990) System enquiry. Wiley,Chichester

    Google Scholar 

  109. Wolstenholme EF (2003) Towards the definition and use of a core set ofarchetypal structures in system dynamics. Syst Dyn Rev 19:7–26

    Google Scholar 

  110. Wolstenholme EF (2004) Using generic system archetypes to support thinkingand modelling. Syst Dyn Rev 20:341–356

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Universidad de Los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia

    Camilo Olaya

Authors
  1. Camilo Olaya
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. RAMTECH LIMITED, 122 Escalle Lane, Larkspur, CA, 94939, USA

    Robert A. Meyers Ph. D. (Editor-in-Chief) (Editor-in-Chief)

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2009 Springer-Verlag

About this entry

Cite this entry

Olaya, C. (2009). System Dynamics Philosophical Background and Underpinnings. In: Meyers, R. (eds) Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-30440-3_544

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation