Logic Without Truth

Stephen Read's criticism of Buridan's solution of the Liar Paradox is based on the charge that while this solution may avoid inconsistency, it does so at the expense of failing to provide a theory of truth. This paper argues that this is one luxury Buridan's logical theory actually can afford: since Buridan does not define formal consequence in terms of truth (and with good reason), his logic simply does not need it. Therefore, Buridan's treatment of the paradox should be regarded as an attempt to eliminate a problem concerning the possibility of the consistent use of semantic predicates under the conditions of semantic closure, rather than as an attempted solution of a problem for a theory of truth. Nevertheless, the concluding section of the paper argues that Buridan's solution fails, because it renders his logical theory inconsistent. A postscript, however, briefly considers an interpretation that may quite plausibly save the consistency of Buridan's theory.