The aim of this paper is to discuss some of the subtleties in the distinct way Stephen Read responds, in his paper “The Truth-Schema and the Liar” to the Liar paradox using an improved formulation of Tarski's T-scheme. Examining the orthodox and the new account of the Liar shows two different ways of tackling the problem of modelling the underlying logic of Liar-type discourse. Specific discussion is provided of Read's key notions of saying that and strict implication, which he uses to articulate his new intensional proposal.
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Sagüillo*, J.M. (2008). On a New Account of the Liar. In: Rahman, S., Tulenheimo, T., Genot, E. (eds) Unity, Truth and the Liar. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8468-3_9
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