Background
Nonmalleability was first defined and explored by Dolev et al. [8], who obtained nonmalleable public-key encryption under all three forms of attack, as well as nonmalleable commitment schemes and nonmalleable zero-knowledge interactive proof systems, all under general assumptions, and also treated nonmalleability of shared-key cryptosystems. Additional constructions under general assumptions appear in [5, 11, 12]. The first practical nm-cca-post cryptosystem is due to Cramer and Shoup [3], and is based on the Decisional Diffie–Hellman assumption (see [4] for schemes based on other assumptions). Canetti and Goldwasser constructed a threshold variation of the Cramer–Shoup public key system.
Barak obtained the first constant-round nonmalleable commitment schemes and zero-knowledge proofs [1]. Relaxed versions of nonmalleable commitment, some in a model in which the sender and the receiver have access to a shared guaranteed-random string or other public parameters, have also...
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Barak B (2002) Constant-round coin-tossing with a man in the middle or realizing the shared random string model. In: Proceedings of FOCS 2002, Vancouver, pp 345–355
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Dwork, C. (2011). Non-Malleability. In: van Tilborg, H.C.A., Jajodia, S. (eds) Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_149
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