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Compromising Emanations

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Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security
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Computer and communications devices emit numerous forms of energy. Many of these emissions are produced as unintended side effects of normal operation. For example, where these emissions take the form of radio waves, they can often be observed interfering with nearby radio receivers. Some of the unintentionally emitted energy carries information about processed data. Under good conditions, a sophisticated and well-equipped eavesdropper can intercept and analyze such compromising emanations to steal information. Even where emissions are intended, as is the case with transmitters and displays, only a small fraction of the overall energy and information content emitted will ever reach the intended recipient. Eavesdroppers can use specialized and more sensitive receiving equipment to tap into the rest and access confidential information, often in unexpected ways, as some of the following examples illustrate.

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Kuhn, M. (2011). Compromising Emanations. In: van Tilborg, H.C.A., Jajodia, S. (eds) Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_188

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