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Reference Monitor

  • Reference work entry
Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security

Related Concepts

Access Control from an OS Security Perspective; Access Control Policies, Models, and Mechanisms; Bell-LaPadula Confidentiality Model; Biba Integrity Model; Security Kernel

Definition

A reference monitor concept defines a set of design requirements on a reference validation mechanism, which enforces an access control policy over subjects’ (e.g., processes and users) ability to perform operations (e.g., read and write) on objects (e.g., files and sockets) on a system.

  • The reference validation mechanism must always be invoked (complete mediation).

  • The reference validation mechanism must be tamperproof (tamperproof ).

  • The reference validation mechanism must be small enough to be subject to analysis and tests, the completeness of which can be assured (verifiable).

The claim is that a reference validation mechanism that satisfies the reference monitor concept will correctly enforce a system’s access control policy, as it must be invoked to mediate all security-sensitive...

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Jaeger, T. (2011). Reference Monitor. In: van Tilborg, H.C.A., Jajodia, S. (eds) Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_646

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