Abstract
This paper is devoted to one of the hot topics these days: open computer networks security. It relies on the use of secure protocols called authentication cryptographic protocols. In the recent several years a lot of attention has been paid to analyze these protocols. One of the methods of their analysis is that of formal methods. Burrows, Abadi, Needham and others have proposed a few logics for verification of the authentication protocols properties (called BANlogic). These are specialized versions of modal belief logic with special constructs for expressing some of the central concepts used in authentication processes. These logics have revealed many subtleties and serious flaws in published and widely applied authentication protocols. Unfortunately, they have also created some confusion. For example, they are not complete. In the present paper we propose a new version of authentication logic. We introduce a convenient formal language for specifying and reasoning about ryptographic protocols properties. We also provide an axiomatic inference system, a model of computation, and semantics. We prove completeness and some other important properties of this logic and discuss its expressive power.
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Kurkowski, M. (2002). A Complete Logic of Authentication. In: Sołdek, J., Pejaś, J. (eds) Advanced Computer Systems. The Springer International Series in Engineering and Computer Science, vol 664. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-8530-9_28
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-8530-9_28
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
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