Abstract
The theory of social situations due to Greenberg is applied to information trading. The solution concept, defined by Nakayama, Quintas, and Muto as a resale-proof trade, is shown to be derived as a unique stable standard of behavior for a situation which we call the information trading situation.
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© 1994 Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
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Muto, S., Nakayama, M. (1994). The Resale-Proof Trade of Information as a Stable Standard of Behavior — An Application of the Theory of Social Situations. In: Megiddo, N. (eds) Essays in Game Theory. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_11
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