Abstract
As is well known, Shapley’s value [7] can be obtained in terms of marginal payoffs to players in randomly formed coalitions. Moreover, Hart and MasColell [2] have shown that the value satisfies a consistency property in terms of reduced games (see also Peleg [6]).
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References
M. Davis and M. Maschler, “The kernel of a cooperative game, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 12 (1965) 223–259.
S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell, “The potential of the Shapley value, in: The Shapley value A. E. Roth, Ed., Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 127–138.
S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell, “A model of n-person non-cooperative bargaining, unpublished manuscript, July 1992.
M. Maschler and G. Owen, “The consistent Shapley value for hyper-plane games, International Journal of Game Theory 18 (1989) 389–407.
M. Maschler and G. Owen, “A consistent Shapley value for games without side payments, in: Rational Interaction: Essays in Honor of J. C. Harsanyi, R. Selten, Ed., Springer-Verlag 1992, pp. 35–43.
B. Peleg, “On the reduced game property and its converse, International Journal of Game Theory 15 (1986) 187–200.
L. S. Shapley, “A value for n-person games, in: Contributions to the Theory of Games II, A. W. Tucker and H. W. Kuhn, Eds., Princeton University Press, 1953, pp. 307–317.
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© 1994 Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
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Owen, G. (1994). The Non-Consistency and Non-Uniqueness of the Consistent Value. In: Megiddo, N. (eds) Essays in Game Theory. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_12
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