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Equilibrium in Supergames

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Essays in Game Theory

Abstract

This paper is the first part of Research Memorandum 25, The Center for Research in Game Theory and Mathematical Economy which was published in May 1977 and was based on my M.Sc. Thesis, written in 1975–6 at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem under the supervision of Professor B. Peleg. Other parts of the report were published in “Equilibrium in Supergames with the Overtaking Criterion,” J. Econ. Theory 21 (1979) 1–9, and “Strong Perfect Equilibrium in Supergames,” International J. Game Theory 9 (1980) 1–12. The main theorem in this paper was discovered simultaneously by R. J. Aumann and L. S. Shapley.

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References

  1. R. J. Aumann, “Acceptable points in general cooperative n-person games,” in: A. W. Tucker and R. C. Luce, Eds., Contributions to the Theory of Games IV, Annals of Mathematics Studies No. 40, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1959, pp. 287–324.

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  2. R. J. Aumann, “Acceptable points in games of perfect information,” Pacific J. Math. 10 (1960) 381–417.

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  5. R. J. Aumann, Lectures on Game Theory, Stanford University, 1976.

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  6. J. W. Friedman, “A non-cooperative equilibrium of supergames,” International Economic Review 12 (1971) 1–12.

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  7. M. Kurz, “Altruistic Equilibrium,” Technical Report No. 156, Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, 1975.

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  9. A. E. Roth, “Self supporting equilibrium in the supergame,” unpublished manuscript, 1975.

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© 1994 Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.

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Rubinstein, A. (1994). Equilibrium in Supergames. In: Megiddo, N. (eds) Essays in Game Theory. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4612-7621-0

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