Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of entry on marriage markets. The paper presents a natural adjustment process for marriage markets and shows that entry on one side of the market makes that side worse off and the other side better off than before entry occurred. An example shows that the adjustment process described by Roth and Vande Vate lacks this property; there may be winners and losers on both sides.
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© 1994 Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
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Bennett, E. (1994). Entry, Divorce and Re-Marriage in Matching Markets. In: Megiddo, N. (eds) Essays in Game Theory. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_3
Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY
Print ISBN: 978-1-4612-7621-0
Online ISBN: 978-1-4612-2648-2
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