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Games in Support Function Form: An Approach to the Kernel of NTU Games

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Essays in Game Theory

Abstract

In this paper, we extend the kernel for transferable utility (TU) games to the nontransferable utility (NTU) case using methods of convex analysis. The kernel for TU games was introduced by Davis and Maschler [9] and its mathematical structure was further developed by Maschler and Peleg [15], [16]. The kernel is a subset of the bargaining set (Aumann and Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley [17], [18].

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics and School of Operations Research and Industrial Engineering, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 14853, USA

    Louis J. Billera

  2. Department of Economics and RUTCOR, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, 08903, USA

    Richard P. McLean

Authors
  1. Louis J. Billera
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  2. Richard P. McLean
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. IBM Almaden Research Center, 650 Harry Road, San Jose, CA, 95120-6099, USA

    Nimrod Megiddo

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© 1994 Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.

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Billera, L.J., McLean, R.P. (1994). Games in Support Function Form: An Approach to the Kernel of NTU Games. In: Megiddo, N. (eds) Essays in Game Theory. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4612-7621-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4612-2648-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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