Abstract
The pioneering work of Aumann, Maschler and Stearns (1968) on infinitely repeated games with incomplete information has obviously given rise to extensions of the Folk theorem. In this paper, we show that their analysis has also provided fundamental hints for the characterization of the solutions of (one-shot) games of information transmission.
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© 1994 Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
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Forges, F. (1994). Non-Zero Sum Repeated Games and Information Transmission. In: Megiddo, N. (eds) Essays in Game Theory. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_6
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