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On Prize Games

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Essays in Game Theory

Abstract

We consider the class of hyperplane coalitional games (Hgames): the feasible set of each coalition is a half-space, with a slope that may vary from one coalition to another. H-games have turned out in various approaches to the value of general non-transferable utility (NTU) games. In this paper we introduce a simple model — prize games — that generates the hyperplane games. Next, we provide an axiomatization for the Maschler & Owen [4] consistent value of H-games.

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References

  1. S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell, “Potential, value and consistency,” Econometrica 57 (1989) 589–614.

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  2. S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell, “Egalitarian solutions of large games: I. A continuum of players,” DP #1, The Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, mimeo, 1992.

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  4. M. Maschler and G. Owen, “The consistent Shapley value for hyper-plane games,” International Journal of Game Theory 18 (1989) 389–407.

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  5. M. Maschler and G. Owen, “The consistent Shapley value for games without side payments,” in: Rational Interaction, R. Selten, Ed., Springer-Verlag, 1992, pp. 5–12.

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  6. A. E. Roth and M. K. Malouf, “Game-theoretic models and the role of information in bargaining”, Psychological Review 86 (1979) 574–594.

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  7. L. S. Shapley, “A Value for n-Person Games,” in: Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Annals of Mathematics Studies 28, H. W. Kuhn & A. W. Tucker, Eds., Princeton University Press, 1953, pp. 307–317.

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Dedicated to Michael Maschler on his 65th birthday.

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© 1994 Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.

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Hart, S. (1994). On Prize Games. In: Megiddo, N. (eds) Essays in Game Theory. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4612-7621-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4612-2648-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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