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Resilience of the Internet Interconnection Ecosystem

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Economics of Information Security and Privacy III

Abstract

In 2010 the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) launched a study to investigate the resilience of the Internet’s interconnection system and come up with policy recommendations. A large number of stakeholders were contacted, and their expertise has been reflected in the study. The formal outcome of the study was the publication by ENISA in early 2011 of a detailed technical report, “Inter-X: Resilience of the Internet Interconnection Ecosystem”. This paper presents a much abridged version of the ENISA report. In it, we present a summary of the problems that the Internet faces in keeping its interconnection system resilient, along with the recommendations proposed to policy makers.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Contrast transit with peering, where an ISP will arrange with another to carry traffic to and from each other’s customers. Since peering with every network in the world is impractical, ISPs will purchase transit contracts to carry the traffic that cannot be handled by peering relationships. Note that transit traffic is invariably paid for, whereas peering (which is usually only with other ISPs of a similar size, or between “content” and “eyeball” ASs) is generally free.

  2. 2.

    An IXP is a location to which many ISPs (and CDNs) connect. For the cost of a single link, they can exchange traffic (usually peering traffic, but sometimes transit) with all the other ISPs and CDNs who are IXP members.

  3. 3.

    An Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Best Common Practice (BCP) is as official as it gets on the Internet.

  4. 4.

    For a popular perception of the problems that government is grappling with see Fight Cyber War Before Planes Fall Out of Sky [79].

  5. 5.

    Just as the final version of the ENISA report was submitted, Level 3 (the transit provider with the largest market share) announced that it was acquiring Global Crossing (the second largest market share) for $3 billion ($1.1 of which is debt assumption), giving the merged company just over half of the market [86].

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Acknowledgements

We would particularly like to thank all the industry, academic and public sector stakeholders that took part in the survey we conducted as part of the study.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Highwayman Associates, Woodvill Cottage, Woodvill Road, Leatherhead, KT22 7BP, UK

    Chris Hall

  2. Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, CB3 0FD, UK

    Ross Anderson & Richard Clayton

  3. European Network and Information Security Agency, 1308, Heraklion, 71001, Greece

    Evangelos Ouzounis & Panagiotis Trimintzios

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Correspondence to Chris Hall .

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    Bruce Schneier

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Hall, C., Anderson, R., Clayton, R., Ouzounis, E., Trimintzios, P. (2013). Resilience of the Internet Interconnection Ecosystem. In: Schneier, B. (eds) Economics of Information Security and Privacy III. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1981-5_6

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