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Majority Equilibrium

  • Reference work entry
  • First Online:
Encyclopedia of Algorithms
  • 248 Accesses

Years and Authors of Summarized Original Work

  • 2003; Chen, Deng, Fang, Tian

Problem Definition

Majority rule is arguably the best decision mechanism for public decision-making, which is employed not only in public management but also in business management. The concept of majority equilibrium captures such a democratic spirit in requiring that no other solutions would please more than half of the voters in comparison to it. The work of Chen, Deng, Fang, and Tian [1] considers a public facility location problem decided via a voting process under the majority rule on a discrete network. This work distinguishes itself from previous work by applying the computational complexity approach to the study of majority equilibrium. For the model with a single public facility located in trees, cycles, and cactus graphs, it is shown that the majority equilibrium can be found in linear time. On the other hand, when the number of public facilities is taken as the input size (not a constant), finding a...

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Recommended Reading

  1. Chen L, Deng X, Fang Q, Tian F (2002) Majority equilibrium for public facility allocation. Lect Notes Comput Sci 2697:435–444

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  2. Demange G (1983) Spatial models of collective choice. In: Thisse JF, Zoller HG (eds) Locational analysis of public facilities. North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam

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  3. Hansen P, Thisse JF (1981) Outcomes of voting and planning: condorcet, weber and rawls locations. J Publ Econ 16:1–15

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  4. Schummer J, Vohra RV (2002) Strategy-proof location on a network. J Econ Theory 104:405–428

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  5. Tullock G (1959) Some problems of majority voting. J Polit Econ 67:571–579

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Correspondence to Qizhi Fang .

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© 2016 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Fang, Q. (2016). Majority Equilibrium. In: Kao, MY. (eds) Encyclopedia of Algorithms. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-2864-4_217

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