Nash Equilibria and Dominant Strategies in Routing

Years and Authors of Summarized Original Work

• 2005; Wang, Li, Chu

Problem Definition

This problem is concerned with the multicast routing and cost sharing in a selfish network composed of relay terminals and receivers. This problem is motivated by the recent observation that the selfish behavior of the network could largely degraded existing system performance, even dysfunction. The work of Wang, Li and Chu [7] first presented some negative results of the strategyproof mechanism in multicast routing and sharing, and then proposed a new solution based on Nash Equilibrium that could greatly improve the performance.

Wang, Li and Chu modeled a network by a link weighted graph ${ G=(V,E,\textbf{c}) }$, where V is the set of all nodes and ${ \textbf{c} }$ is the cost vector of the set E of links. For a multicast session, let Q denote the set of all receivers. In game theoretical networking literatures, usually there are two models for the multicast cost/payment sharing.

Axiom Model...