Synonyms
Dominant strategy mechanisms; Incentive compatible mechanisms; Single-parameter agents; Truthful auctions
Years and Authors of Summarized Original Work
2001; Archer, Tardos
Problem Definition
This problem is concerned with designing truthful (dominant strategy) mechanisms for domains where each agent’s private information is expressed by a single positive real number. The goal of the mechanisms is to allocate loads placed on the agents, and an agent’s private information is the cost incurred per unit load. Archer and Tardos [4] give an exact characterization for the algorithms that can be used to design truthful mechanisms for such load balancing problems using appropriate payments. The characterization shows that the allocated load must be monotonic in the cost (decreasing when the cost on an agent increases, fixing the costs of the others). Thus, truthful mechanisms are characterized by a condition on the allocation rule, and payments that ensure voluntary participation can...
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Babaioff, M. (2016). Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents. In: Kao, MY. (eds) Encyclopedia of Algorithms. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-2864-4_436
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