Years and Authors of Summarized Original Work
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2007; Bu, Deng, Qi
Problem Definition
The model studied here is the same as that which is first presented in [10] by Varian. For some keyword, \(\mathcal{N} = \left \{1,2,\ldots ,N\right \}\) advertisers bid \(\mathcal{K} = \left \{1,2,\ldots ,K\right \}\) advertisement slots (K < N) which will be displayed on the search result page from top to bottom. The higher the advertisement is positioned, the more conspicuous it is and the more clicks it receives. Thus for any two slots \(k_{1},k_{2} \in \mathcal{K}\), if \(k_{1} <k_{2}\), then slot k1’s click-through rate (CTR) \(c_{k_{1}}\) is larger than \(c_{k_{2}}\). That is, \(c_{1}> c_{2}>\ldots> c_{K}\), from top to bottom, respectively. Moreover, each bidder \(i \in \mathcal{N}\) has privately known information, vi, which represents the expected return of per click to bidder i.
According to each bidder i’s submitted bid bi, the auctioneer then decides how to distribute the advertisement...
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Abrams Z (2006) Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets. In: Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on discrete algorithms (SODA-06), Miami, pp 1074–1082
Aggarwal G, Feldman J, Muthukrishnan S (2006) Bidding to the top: VCG and equilibria of position-based auctions. In: Proceedings of the 4th international workshop on approximation and online algorithms (WAOA-2006), Zurich, pp 15–28
Borgs C, Chayes J, Etesami O, Immorlica N, Jain K, Mahdian M (2006) Bid optimization in online advertisement auctions. In: 2nd workshop on sponsored search auctions (SSA2006), in conjunction with the ACM conference on electronic commerce (EC-06), Ann Arbor
Bu TM, Deng X, Qi Q (2008) Forward looking nash equilibrium for keyword auction. Inf Process Lett 105(2):41–46
Bu TM, Qi Q, Sun AW (2008) Unconditional competitive auctions with copy and budget constraints. Theor Comput Sci 393(1–3):1–13
Cary M, Das A, Edelman B, Giotis I, Heimerl K, Karlin AR, Mathieu C, Schwarz M (2007) Greedy bidding strategies for keyword auctions. In: Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on electronic commerce (EC-2007), San Diego, pp 262–271
Chen X, Deng X, Liu BJ (2006) On incentive compatible competitive selection protocol. In: Proceedings of the 12th annual international computing and combinatorics conference (COCOON06), Taipei, pp 13–22
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Kitts B, Leblanc B (2004) Optimal bidding on keyword auctions. Electron Mark Spec Issue Innov Auction Mark 14(3):186–201
Varian HR (2007) Position auctions. Int J Ind Organ 25(6):1163–1178
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Bu, TM. (2016). Adwords Pricing. In: Kao, MY. (eds) Encyclopedia of Algorithms. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-2864-4_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-2864-4_5
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