Years and Authors of Summarized Original Work
-
2007; McSherry, Talwar
-
2011; Ghosh, Roth
-
2012; Nissim, Orlandi, Smorodinsky
-
2012; Fleischer, Lyu
-
2012; Ligett, Roth
-
2013; Chen, Chong, Kash, Moran, Vadhan
-
2014; Nissim, Vadhan, Xiao
Problem Definition
Mechanism design and private data analysis both study the question of performing computations over data collected from individual agents while satisfying additional restrictions. The focus in mechanism design is on performing computations that are compatible with the incentives of the individual agents, and the additional restrictions are toward motivating agents to participate in the computation (individual rationality) and toward having them report their true data (incentive compatibility). The focus in private data analysis is on performing computations that limit the information leaked by the output on each individual agent’s sensitive data, and the additional restriction is on the influence each agent may have on the outcome distribution...
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Recommended Reading
Alpert CJ, Chan T, Kahng AB, Markov IL, Mulet P (1998) Faster minimization of linear wirelength for global placement. IEEE Trans CAD 17(1):3–13
Chen Y, Chong S, Kash IA, Moran T, Vadhan SP (2013) Truthful mechanisms for agents that value privacy. In: EC 2013, Philadelphia, pp 215–232
Dwork C, McSherry F, Nissim K, Smith A (2006) Calibrating noise to sensitivity in private data analysis. In: TCC 2006, New York, pp 265–284
Fleischer L, Lyu Y-H (2012) Approximately optimal auctions for selling privacy when costs are correlated with data. In: EC 2012, Valencia, pp 568–585
Ghosh A, Roth A (2011) Selling privacy at auction. In: EC 2011, San Jose, pp 199–208
Huang Z, Kannan S (2012) The exponential mechanism for social welfare: private, truthful, and nearly optimal. In: FOCS 2012, New Brunswick, pp 140–149
Ligett K, Roth A (2012) Take it or leave it: running a survey when privacy comes at a cost. In: WINE 2012, Liverpool, pp 378–391
McSherry F, Talwar K (2007) Mechanism design via differential privacy. In: FOCS 2007, Providence, pp 94–103
Nissim K, Orlandi C, Smorodinsky R (2012) Privacy-aware mechanism design. In: EC 2012, Valencia, pp 774–789
Nissim K, Smorodinsky R, Tennenholtz M (2012) Approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy. In: ITCS 2012, Boston, pp 203–213
Nissim K, Vadhan SP, Xiao D (2014) Redrawing the boundaries on purchasing data from privacy-sensitive individuals. In: ITCS 2014, Princeton, pp 411–422
Xiao D (2013) Is privacy compatible with truthfulness? In: ITCS 2013, Berkeley, pp 67–86
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Springer Science+Business Media New York
About this entry
Cite this entry
Nisim, K., Xiao, D. (2016). Mechanism Design and Differential Privacy. In: Kao, MY. (eds) Encyclopedia of Algorithms. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-2864-4_548
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-2864-4_548
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY
Print ISBN: 978-1-4939-2863-7
Online ISBN: 978-1-4939-2864-4
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceReference Module Computer Science and Engineering