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Error Tolerant ASCA on FPGA

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Cloud Computing and Security (ICCCS 2018)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 11065))

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Abstract

Algebraic Side-Channel Attack (ASCA) is a side-channel attack that models the cryptographic algorithm and side-channel leakage from the system as a set of equations, then solves for the secret key. Unlike pure side-channel attacks, ASCA has low data complexity and can succeed in unknown plaintext/ciphertext scenarios. However, past research on ASCA has been done on either 8-bit microcontroller data or simulated data. In this paper, we explore the application and feasibility of error tolerant ASCA on different platforms, such as field-programmable gate array (FPGA) and examines the error model of Hamming weights in terms of success of the attack. FPGA runs faster and is more difficult for encryption power trace to be isolated so it presents more of a challenge for the attacker. Since FPGA is as susceptible to ASCA as 8-bit micro-controllers, the attack could have widespread implications since it may be applicable to other hardware platforms as well.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science and Engineering Department, School of Engineering, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, 06269-4155, USA

    Chujiao Ma & John Chandy

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  1. Chujiao Ma
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  2. John Chandy
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Correspondence to Chujiao Ma .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, Nanjing, China

    Xingming Sun

  2. Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, Nanjing, China

    Zhaoqing Pan

  3. Department of Computer Science, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA

    Elisa Bertino

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Ma, C., Chandy, J. (2018). Error Tolerant ASCA on FPGA. In: Sun, X., Pan, Z., Bertino, E. (eds) Cloud Computing and Security. ICCCS 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11065. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00012-7_51

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00012-7_51

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-00011-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-00012-7

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