Skip to main content

Distributed Aggregative Games on Graphs in Adversarial Environments

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Decision and Game Theory for Security (GameSec 2018)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11199))

Included in the following conference series:

  • 1987 Accesses

Abstract

Existing solutions to aggregative games assume that all players are fully trustworthy for cooperative tasks or, in a worst-case scenario, are selfish players with no intent to intentionally harm the network. Nevertheless, the need to believe that players will behave consistently exposes the network to vulnerabilities associated with cyber-physical attacks. This paper investigates the effects of cyber-physical attacks on the outcome of distributed aggregative games (DAGs). More specifically, we are seeking to answer two main questions: (1) how a stealthy attack can deviate the game outcome from a cooperative Nash equilibrium, and by doing so, (2) by how much efficiency of a DAG degrades. To this end, we first show that adversaries can stealthily manipulate the outcome of a DAG by compromising the Nash equilibrium solution and consequently lead to an emergent misbehavior or no emergent behavior. This study will intensify the urgency of designing novel resilient solutions to DAGs so that the overall network sustains some notion of acceptable global behavior in the presence of malicious agents. Finally, we corroborate and illustrate our results by providing simulation examples. Simulations reveal that the adverse effect of a compromised agent is considerably worse than that of a selfish agent.

Research reported in this paper was sponsored in part by the Army Research Laboratory and was accomplished under Cooperative Agreement Number W911NF-17-2-0196. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the Army Research Laboratory or the U.S. Government.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  1. Cornes, R., Hartley, R.: Fully aggregative games. Econ. Lett. 116(3), 631–633 (2012)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  2. Huang, M., Caines, P.E., Malhame, R.P.: Large-population cost-coupled LQG problems with nonuniform agents: Individual-mass behavior and decentralized Nash equilibria. IEEE Trans. Autom. Control 52, 1560–1571 (2007)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  3. Lasry, J.-M., Lions, P.-L.: Mean field games. Jpn. J. Math. 2, 229–260 (2007)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  4. Bauso, D., Pesenti, R.: Mean field linear quadratic games with set up costs. Dyn. Games Appl. 3, 89–104 (2013)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  5. Grammatico, S., Parise, F., Colombino, M., Lygeros, J.: Decentralized convergence to Nash equilibria in constrained deterministic mean field control. IEEE Trans. Autom. Control 61, 3315–3329 (2016)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  6. Bauso, D., Tembine, H., Başar, T.: Robust mean field games. Dyn. Games Appl. 6, 277–303 (2016)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  7. Moon, J., Başar, T.: Linear quadratic risk-sensitive and robust mean field games. IEEE Trans. Autom. Control 62, 1062–1077 (2017)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  8. Mohsenian-Rad, A.H., Wong, V.W.S., Jatskevich, J., Schober, R., Leon-Garcia, A.: Autonomous demand-side management based on game-theoretic energy consumption scheduling for the future smart grid. IEEE Trans. Smart Grid 1, 320–331 (2010)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Bagagiolo, F., Bauso, D.: Mean-field games and dynamic demand management in power grids. Dyn. Games Appl. 4, 155–176 (2014)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  10. Chen, H., Li, Y., Louie, R.H.Y., Vucetic, B.: Autonomous demand side management based on energy consumption scheduling and instantaneous load billing: an aggregative game approach. IEEE Trans. Smart Grid 5, 1744–1754 (2014)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  11. Ma, Z., Callaway, D.S., Hiskens, I.A.: Decentralized charging control of large populations of plug-in electric vehicles. IEEE Trans. Control Syst. Technol. 21, 67–78 (2013)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  12. Parise, F., Colombino, M., Grammatico, S., Lygeros, J.: Mean field constrained charging policy for large populations of plug-in electric vehicles. In: 53rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, pp. 5101–5106, December 2014

    Google Scholar 

  13. Alpcan, T., Başar, T.: Distributed algorithms for Nash equilibria of flow control games, pp. 473–498. Birkhäuser, Boston (2005)

    Google Scholar 

  14. Başar, T.: Control and game-theoretic tools for communication networks. Appl. Comput. Math. 6(2), 104–125 (2007)

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  15. Barrera, J., Garcia, A.: Dynamic incentives for congestion control. IEEE Trans. Autom. Control 60, 299–310 (2015)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  16. Kizilkale, A.C., Mannor, S., Caines, P.E.: Large scale real-time bidding in the smart grid: a mean field framework. In: 2012 IEEE 51st IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC, pp. 3680–3687, December 2012

    Google Scholar 

  17. Koshal, J., Nedi, A., Shanbhag, U.V.: A gossip algorithm for aggregative games on graphs. In: 2012 IEEE 51st IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC, pp. 4840–4845, December 2012

    Google Scholar 

  18. Swenson, B., Kar, S., Xavier, J.: Distributed learning in large-scale multi-agent games: a modified fictitious play approach. In: 2012 Conference Record of the Forty Sixth Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ASILOMAR, pp. 1490–1495, November 2012

    Google Scholar 

  19. Koshal, J., Nedić, A., Shanbhag, U.V.: Distributed algorithms for aggregative games on graphs. Oper. Res. 64(3), 680–704 (2016)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  20. Parise, F., Gentile, B., Grammatico, S., Lygeros, J.: Network aggregative games: distributed convergence to Nash equilibria. In: 2015 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC, pp. 2295–2300, December 2015

    Google Scholar 

  21. Başar, T., Olsder, G.J.: Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory. SIAM, Philadelphia (1999)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  22. Ye, M., Hu, G.: Game design and analysis for price-based demand response: an aggregate game approach. IEEE Trans. Cybern. 47, 720–730 (2017)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  23. Teixeira, A., Sandberg, H., Johansson, K.H.: Networked control systems under cyber attacks with applications to power networks. In: Proceedings of the 2010 American Control Conference, pp. 3690–3696, June 2010

    Google Scholar 

  24. Sundaram, S., Hadjicostis, C.N.: Distributed function calculation via linear iterative strategies in the presence of malicious agents. IEEE Trans. Autom. Control 56, 1495–1508 (2011)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  25. Pasqualetti, F., Bicchi, A., Bullo, F.: Consensus computation in unreliable networks: a system theoretic approach. IEEE Trans. Autom. Control 57, 90–104 (2012)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  26. Pasqualetti, F., Drfler, F., Bullo, F.: Attack detection and identification in cyber-physical systems. IEEE Trans. Autom. Control 58, 2715–2729 (2013)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  27. Zhu, M., Martnez, S.: On the performance analysis of resilient networked control systems under replay attacks. IEEE Trans. Autom. Control 59, 804–808 (2014)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  28. Zhu, Q., Başar, T.: Game-theoretic methods for robustness, security, and resilience of cyberphysical control systems: games-in-games principle for optimal cross-layer resilient control systems. IEEE Control Syst. 35, 46–65 (2015)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  29. Mo, Y., Sinopoli, B.: Secure estimation in the presence of integrity attacks. IEEE Trans. Autom. Control 60, 1145–1151 (2015)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  30. Khanafer, A., Baar, T.: Robust distributed averaging: when are potential-theoretic strategies optimal? IEEE Trans. Autom. Control 61, 1767–1779 (2016)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  31. Moghadam, R., Modares, H.: An internal model principle for the attacker in distributed control systems. In: 2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC, pp. 6604–6609, December 2017

    Google Scholar 

  32. Kamdem, G., Kamhoua, C., Lu, Y., Shetty, S., Njilla, L.: A Markov game theoritic approach for power grid security. In: 2017 IEEE 37th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops, ICDCSW, pp. 139–144, June 2017

    Google Scholar 

  33. Freeman, R.A., Yang, P., Lynch, K.M.: Stability and convergence properties of dynamic average consensus estimators. In: Proceedings of the 45th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, pp. 338–343, December 2006

    Google Scholar 

  34. Haghshenas, H., Badamchizadeh, M.A., Baradarannia, M.: Containment control of heterogeneous linear multi-agent systems. Automatica 54, 210–216 (2015)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Bahare Kiumarsi .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this paper

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this paper

Kiumarsi, B., Başar, T. (2018). Distributed Aggregative Games on Graphs in Adversarial Environments. In: Bushnell, L., Poovendran, R., Başar, T. (eds) Decision and Game Theory for Security. GameSec 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11199. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01554-1_17

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01554-1_17

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-01553-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-01554-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics