Skip to main content

FriSM: Malicious Exploit Kit Detection via Feature-Based String-Similarity Matching

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Security and Privacy in Communication Networks (SecureComm 2018)

Abstract

Since an exploit kit (EK) was first developed, an increasing number of attempts has been made to infect users’ PCs by transmitting malware via EKs. To tackle such malware distribution, we propose herein an enhanced similarity-matching technique that determines whether the test sets are similar to the pattern sets in which the structural properties of EKs are defined. A key characteristic of our similarity-matching technique is that, unlike typical pattern-matching, it can detect isomorphic variants derived from EKs. In an experiment involving 36,950 datasets, our similarity-matching technique provides a TP rate of 99.9% and an FP rate of 0.001% with a performance of 0.003 s/page.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    To avoid detection, attackers use split(), escape(), eval(), XOR/8-bit ASCII/BASE64 or their own encoding, and JavaScript compression tools. The outputs of these methods yield obfuscated strings with %, +, \(\setminus \)x, or $ as the first character. In recent years, EKs often hide JavaScript functions.

  2. 2.

    See https://drive.google.com/open?id=1tfBCB1tcfxg3GNo7yZwYUCqhABjbbN-P.

  3. 3.

    The feature extraction uses the JavaScript, HTML, and VBScript codes. We use the original code before it is interpreted by JavaScript engines, such as jscript.dll or V8.

  4. 4.

    See https://drive.google.com/open?id=1UVg-gbfIv7NTabq90UkVKt3CeleBEBY9. Patterns for classification (left) and clustered patterns for matching (right).

  5. 5.

    See https://drive.google.com/open?id=143nOUCKBMgB8t7g8PEJvh8yryBLYhAK-.

  6. 6.

    We offer brief sample outputs for both TNs and FP cases at this website:

    https://drive.google.com/open?id=1QDl1Kpyq85arwHCuvU7qiJGVoWOhUuhP.

References

  1. Stringhini, G., Kruegel, C., Vigna, G.: Shady paths: leveraging surfing crowds to detect malicious web pages. In: Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 133–144. ACM (2013)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Eshete, B., Venkatakrishnan, V.N.: Webwinnow: leveraging exploit kit workflows to detect malicious URLs. In: Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy, pp. 305–312. ACM (2014)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Šrndić, N., Laskov, P.: Hidost: a static machine-learning-based detector of malicious files. EURASIP J. Inf. Secur. 22 (2016)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Thug. https://www.honeynet.org/taxonomy/term/218. Accessed 6 Nov 2017

  5. Kim, S., Kim, S., Kim, D.: LoGos internet-explorer-based malicious webpage detection. ETRI J. 39, 406–416 (2017). https://doi.org/10.4218/etrij.17.0116.0810

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Edwards, D.: http://dean.edwards.name/packer/. Accessed 12 Oct 2017

  7. Levenshtein distance. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Levenshtein_distance. Accessed 12 Oct 2017

  8. Ratcliff, J.W., Metzener, D.E.: Pattern-matching-the gestalt approach. Dr Dobbs J. 13(7), 46 (1988)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Dice similarity coefficient. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/sorensen-Dice_coefficient. Accessed 12 Oct 2017

  10. Jaccard, P.: Distribution de la flore alpine dans le bassin des Dranses et dans quelques régions voisines. Bulletin de la Société Vaudoise des Sciences Naturelles pp. 241–272 (1901)

    Google Scholar 

  11. Taylor, T., et al.: Detecting malicious exploit kits using tree-based similarity searches. In: Proceedings of the Sixth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy, pp. 255–266. ACM (2016)

    Google Scholar 

  12. Perdisci, R., Lee, W., Feamster, N.: Behavioral clustering of HTTP-based malware and signature generation using malicious network traces. In: NSDI, vol. 10, p. 14 (2010)

    Google Scholar 

  13. Cui, Q., Jourdan, G.V., Bochmann, G.V., Couturier, R., Onut, I.V.: Tracking phishing attacks over time. In: Proceedings of the 26th International Conference on World Wide Web International World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee, pp. 667–676 (2017)

    Google Scholar 

  14. Kapravelos, A., Shoshitaishvili, Y., Cova, M., Kruegel, C., Vigna, G.: Revolver: an automated approach to the detection of evasive web-based malware. In: USENIX Security Symposium, pp. 637–652 (2013)

    Google Scholar 

  15. Stock, B., Livshits, B., Zorn, B.: Kizzle: a signature compiler for detecting exploit kits. In: 46th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN), IEEE (2016)

    Google Scholar 

  16. Canali, D., Cova, M., Vigna, G., Kruegel, C.: Prophiler: a fast filter for the large-scale detection of malicious web pages. In: Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on World Wide Web, pp. 197–206. ACM (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  17. Eshete, B., Villafiorita, A., Weldemariam, K.: BINSPECT: holistic analysis and detection of malicious web pages. In: Keromytis, A.D., Di Pietro, R. (eds.) SecureComm 2012. LNICST, vol. 106, pp. 149–166. Springer, Heidelberg (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36883-7_10

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  18. Choi, H., Zhu, B.B., Lee, H.: Detecting malicious web links and identifying their attack types. WebApps 11, 11 (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  19. YARA. https://virustotal.github.io/yara/. Accessed 25 Nov 2017

  20. PhantomJS. http://phantomjs.org/. Accessed 25 Nov 2017

  21. Malware-Traffic-Analysis.Net. http://www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/. Accessed 20 Feb 2018

  22. Alexa. http://www.alexa.com/topsites. Accessed 18 Nov 2017

  23. VirusTotal. https://www.virustotal.com/. Accessed 18 Nov 2017

Download references

Acknowledgements

This research was supported by the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning, Korea, under the Human Resource Development Project for Brain Scouting Program (IITP-2017-0-01889) supervised by the IITP.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Brent ByungHoon Kang .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

About this paper

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this paper

Kim, S., Kang, B.B. (2018). FriSM: Malicious Exploit Kit Detection via Feature-Based String-Similarity Matching. In: Beyah, R., Chang, B., Li, Y., Zhu, S. (eds) Security and Privacy in Communication Networks. SecureComm 2018. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 254. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01701-9_23

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01701-9_23

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-01700-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-01701-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics