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HoneyPAKEs

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Security Protocols XXVI (Security Protocols 2018)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11286))

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Abstract

We combine two security mechanisms: using a Password-based Authenticated Key Establishment (PAKE) protocol to protect the password for access control and the Honeywords construction of Juels and Rivest to detect loss of password files. The resulting construction combines the properties of both mechanisms: ensuring that the password is intrinsically protected by the PAKE protocol during transmission and the Honeywords mechanisms for detecting attempts to exploit a compromised password file. Our constructions lead very naturally to two factor type protocols. An enhanced version of our protocol further provides protection against a compromised login server by ensuring that it does not learn the index to the true password.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Typically the session ID is defined as the concatenation of the messages exchanged between C and S without the confirmation code.

References

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Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Marjan Skrobot for helpful discussions. We would like to thank the Luxembourg National Research Fund (FNR) for funding, in particular PBR was supported by the FNR INTER-Sequoia project which is joint with the ANR project SEQUOIA ANR-14-CE28-0030-01, and JB was supported by the FNR CORE project AToMS.

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Correspondence to Peter Y. A. Ryan .

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Becerra, J., Rønne, P.B., Ryan, P.Y.A., Sala, P. (2018). HoneyPAKEs. In: Matyáš, V., Švenda, P., Stajano, F., Christianson, B., Anderson, J. (eds) Security Protocols XXVI. Security Protocols 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11286. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03251-7_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03251-7_7

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