Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Public-Key Encryption with Selective Opening Security from General Assumptions

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Information Security and Cryptology (Inscrypt 2018)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11449))

Included in the following conference series:

  • 1559 Accesses

Abstract

In a selective opening (SO) attack, the attacker can corrupt a subset of senders (or receivers) to open some of the ciphertexts and try to learn information on the plaintexts of unopened ciphertexts. It is important and practical to consider SO attack in encryption scheme. In this paper we study public key encryption (PKE) schemes with SO security. Specifically:

  • First, we define a new cryptographic primitive called tweaked lossy encryption, and we prove that it has simulation-based security against sender selective opening chosen plaintext attacks (denoted by SIM-SSO-CPA).

  • Second, we provide a general construction of tweaked lossy encryption scheme from extractable \({\Sigma }\)-protocol; and we propose two instantiations of tweaked lossy encryption, based on dual-mode commitments and Twin-Cramer-Shoup scheme respectively.

  • Finally, we propose a general scheme satisfying indistinguishability-based security against receiver selective opening chosen plaintext attacks (denoted by IND-RSO-CPA), and we give a construction of the scheme from explainable hash proof systems (denoted by EHPS), and we provide the security analysis.

Our results provide a new insight about the relations among PKE schemes with SO security, extractable \(\mathrm {\Sigma }\)-protocol and explainable hash proof systems.

This work was supported in by the National Key Research and Development Program of China-the Key Technologies for High Security Mobile Terminals (Grant No. 2017YFB0801903).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  1. Abdalla, M., Benhamouda, F., Pointcheval, D.: Removing erasures with explainable hash proof systems. In: Fehr, S. (ed.) PKC 2017. LNCS, vol. 10174, pp. 151–174. Springer, Heidelberg (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54365-8_7

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  2. Bellare, M., Dowsley, R., Waters, B., Yilek, S.: Standard security does not imply security against selective-opening. In: Pointcheval, D., Johansson, T. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2012. LNCS, vol. 7237, pp. 645–662. Springer, Heidelberg (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_38

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  3. Bellare, M., Hofheinz, D., Yilek, S.: Possibility and impossibility results for encryption and commitment secure under selective opening. In: Joux, A. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2009. LNCS, vol. 5479, pp. 1–35. Springer, Heidelberg (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01001-9_1

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  4. Böhl, F., Hofheinz, D., Kraschewski, D.: On definitions of selective opening security. In: Fischlin, M., Buchmann, J., Manulis, M. (eds.) PKC 2012. LNCS, vol. 7293, pp. 522–539. Springer, Heidelberg (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30057-8_31

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  5. Boyen, X., Li, Q.: All-but-many lossy trapdoor functions from lattices and applications. In: Katz, J., Shacham, H. (eds.) CRYPTO 2017. LNCS, vol. 10403, pp. 298–331. Springer, Cham (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63697-9_11

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  6. Canetti, R., Dwork, C., Naor, M., Ostrovsky, R.: Deniable encryption. In: Kaliski, B.S. (ed.) CRYPTO 1997. LNCS, vol. 1294, pp. 90–104. Springer, Heidelberg (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0052229

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  7. Canetti, R., Feige, U., Goldreich, O., Naor, M.: Adaptively secure multi-party computation. In: Miller, G.L. (ed.) Twenty-Eighth Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing. STOC 1996, pp. 639–648. ACM (1996)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Cash, D., Kiltz, E., Shoup, V.: The twin diffie-hellman problem and applications. In: Smart, N. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2008. LNCS, vol. 4965, pp. 127–145. Springer, Heidelberg (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78967-3_8

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  9. Cramer, R., Shoup, V.: Design and analysis of practical public-key encryption schemes secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. SIAM J. Comput. 33(1), 167–226 (2003)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  10. Damgård, I., Groth, J.: Non-interactive and reusable non-malleable commitment schemes. In: Larmore, L.L., Goemans, M.X. (eds.) Proceedings of the 35th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing 2003, pp. 426–437. ACM (2003)

    Google Scholar 

  11. Damgård, I., Nielsen, J.B.: Improved non-committing encryption schemes based on a general complexity assumption. In: Bellare, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2000. LNCS, vol. 1880, pp. 432–450. Springer, Heidelberg (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44598-6_27

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  12. Deng, Y., Lin, D.: Instance-dependent verifiable random functions and their application to simultaneous resettability. In: Naor, M. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2007. LNCS, vol. 4515, pp. 148–168. Springer, Heidelberg (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72540-4_9

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  13. Dwork, C., Naor, M., Reingold, O., Stockmeyer, L.J.: Magic functions. In: 40th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science. FOCS 1999, pp. 523–534 (1999)

    Google Scholar 

  14. Fehr, S., Hofheinz, D., Kiltz, E., Wee, H.: Encryption schemes secure against chosen-ciphertext selective opening attacks. In: Gilbert, H. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2010. LNCS, vol. 6110, pp. 381–402. Springer, Heidelberg (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13190-5_20

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  15. Fuchsbauer, G., Heuer, F., Kiltz, E., Pietrzak, K.: Standard security does imply security against selective opening for markov distributions. In: Kushilevitz, E., Malkin, T. (eds.) TCC 2016. LNCS, vol. 9562, pp. 282–305. Springer, Heidelberg (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-49096-9_12

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  16. Fujisaki, E.: All-but-many encryption. A new framework for fully-equipped UC commitments. In: Sarkar, P., Iwata, T. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2014. LNCS, vol. 8874, pp. 426–447. Springer, Heidelberg (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45608-8_23

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  17. Goldwasser, S., Micali, S., Rackoff, C.: The knowledge complexity of interactive proof-systems. In: Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing. STOC 1985, pp. 291–304. ACM, New York (1985)

    Google Scholar 

  18. Hara, K., Kitagawa, F., Matsuda, T., Hanaoka, G., Tanaka, K.: Simulation-based receiver selective opening CCA secure PKE from standard computational assumptions. In: Catalano, D., De Prisco, R. (eds.) SCN 2018. LNCS, vol. 11035, pp. 140–159. Springer, Cham (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98113-0_8

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  19. Hazay, C., Patra, A., Warinschi, B.: Selective opening security for receivers. In: Iwata, T., Cheon, J.H. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2015. LNCS, vol. 9452, pp. 443–469. Springer, Heidelberg (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48797-6_19

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  20. Hemenway, B., Libert, B., Ostrovsky, R., Vergnaud, D.: Lossy encryption: constructions from general assumptions and efficient selective opening chosen ciphertext security. In: Lee, D.H., Wang, X. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2011. LNCS, vol. 7073, pp. 70–88. Springer, Heidelberg (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25385-0_4

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  21. Heuer, F., Jager, T., Kiltz, E., Schäge, S.: On the selective opening security of practical public-key encryption schemes. In: Katz, J. (ed.) PKC 2015. LNCS, vol. 9020, pp. 27–51. Springer, Heidelberg (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46447-2_2

    Chapter  MATH  Google Scholar 

  22. Heuer, F., Jager, T., Schäge, S., Kiltz, E.: Selective opening security of practical public-key encryption schemes. IET Inf. Secur. 10(6), 304–318 (2016)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  23. Heuer, F., Poettering, B.: Selective opening security from simulatable data encapsulation. In: Cheon, J.H., Takagi, T. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2016. LNCS, vol. 10032, pp. 248–277. Springer, Heidelberg (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53890-6_9

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  24. Hofheinz, D.: All-but-many lossy trapdoor functions. In: Pointcheval, D., Johansson, T. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2012. LNCS, vol. 7237, pp. 209–227. Springer, Heidelberg (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_14

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  25. Hofheinz, D., Jager, T., Rupp, A.: Public-key encryption with simulation-based selective-opening security and compact ciphertexts. In: Hirt, M., Smith, A. (eds.) TCC 2016. LNCS, vol. 9986, pp. 146–168. Springer, Heidelberg (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53644-5_6

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  26. Hofheinz, D., Rao, V., Wichs, D.: Standard security does not imply indistinguishability under selective opening. In: Hirt, M., Smith, A. (eds.) TCC 2016. LNCS, vol. 9986, pp. 121–145. Springer, Heidelberg (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53644-5_5

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  27. Hofheinz, D., Rupp, A.: Standard versus selective opening security: separation and equivalence results. In: Lindell, Y. (ed.) TCC 2014. LNCS, vol. 8349, pp. 591–615. Springer, Heidelberg (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54242-8_25

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  28. Huang, Z., Lai, J., Chen, W., Au, M.H., Peng, Z., Li, J.: Simulation-based selective opening security for receivers under chosen-ciphertext attacks. Des. Codes Cryptogr. 1–27 (2018)

    Google Scholar 

  29. Huang, Z., Liu, S., Qin, B.: Sender-equivocable encryption schemes secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks revisited. In: Kurosawa, K., Hanaoka, G. (eds.) PKC 2013. LNCS, vol. 7778, pp. 369–385. Springer, Heidelberg (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36362-7_23

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  30. Jia, D., Lu, X., Li, B.: Receiver selective opening security from indistinguishability obfuscation. In: Dunkelman, O., Sanadhya, S.K. (eds.) INDOCRYPT 2016. LNCS, vol. 10095, pp. 393–410. Springer, Cham (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49890-4_22

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  31. Jia, D., Lu, X., Li, B.: Constructions secure against receiver selective opening and chosen ciphertext attacks. In: Handschuh, H. (ed.) CT-RSA 2017. LNCS, vol. 10159, pp. 417–431. Springer, Cham (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52153-4_24

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  32. Libert, B., Sakzad, A., Stehlé, D., Steinfeld, R.: All-but-many lossy trapdoor functions and selective opening chosen-ciphertext security from LWE. In: Katz, J., Shacham, H. (eds.) CRYPTO 2017. LNCS, vol. 10403, pp. 332–364. Springer, Cham (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63697-9_12

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  33. Lindell, Y.: An efficient transform from sigma protocols to NIZK with a CRS and non-programmable random oracle. In: Dodis, Y., Nielsen, J.B. (eds.) TCC 2015. LNCS, vol. 9014, pp. 93–109. Springer, Heidelberg (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46494-6_5

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  34. Liu, S., Paterson, K.G.: Simulation-based selective opening CCA security for PKE from key encapsulation mechanisms. In: Katz, J. (ed.) PKC 2015. LNCS, vol. 9020, pp. 3–26. Springer, Heidelberg (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46447-2_1

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  35. Micciancio, D., Ong, S.J., Sahai, A., Vadhan, S.: Concurrent zero knowledge without complexity assumptions. In: Halevi, S., Rabin, T. (eds.) TCC 2006. LNCS, vol. 3876, pp. 1–20. Springer, Heidelberg (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/11681878_1

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  36. Nielsen, J.B.: Separating random oracle proofs from complexity theoretic proofs: the non-committing encryption case. In: Yung, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2002. LNCS, vol. 2442, pp. 111–126. Springer, Heidelberg (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45708-9_8

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  37. Peikert, C., Vaikuntanathan, V., Waters, B.: A framework for efficient and composable oblivious transfer. In: Wagner, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 2008. LNCS, vol. 5157, pp. 554–571. Springer, Heidelberg (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85174-5_31

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  38. Peikert, C., Waters, B.: Lossy trapdoor functions and their applications. In: Proceedings of the 40th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 187–196 (2008)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

The authors thank China Scholarship Council for supporting Shuang Hu’s (CSC Student No. 201706230130) work, and she is a visiting student at Virginia Commonwealth University from 2017 to 2019. The authors would like to also thank Dingding Jia for helpful discussions and advice, as well as the anonymous reviewers for their invaluable comments and suggestions.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Dali Zhu & Renjun Zhang

  2. School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Dali Zhu & Renjun Zhang

  3. SKLIATIS, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China

    Shuang Hu & Gongliang Chen

  4. Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA, USA

    Shuang Hu

Authors
  1. Dali Zhu
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Renjun Zhang
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Shuang Hu
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  4. Gongliang Chen
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Renjun Zhang .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

    Fuchun Guo

  2. Fujian Normal University, Fujian, China

    Xinyi Huang

  3. Columbia University, New York, NY, USA

    Moti Yung

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this paper

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this paper

Zhu, D., Zhang, R., Hu, S., Chen, G. (2019). Public-Key Encryption with Selective Opening Security from General Assumptions. In: Guo, F., Huang, X., Yung, M. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology. Inscrypt 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11449. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14234-6_27

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14234-6_27

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-14233-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-14234-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation