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Virtual Security Evaluation

An Operational Methodology for Side-Channel Leakage Detection at Source-Code Level

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Codes, Cryptology and Information Security (C2SI 2019)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11445))

Abstract

“An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure”. This paper presents a methodology to detect side-channel leakage at source-code level. It leverages simple tests performed on noise-less traces of execution, and returns to the developer accurate information about the security issues. The feedback is in terms of location (where in code, when in time), in terms of security severity (amount and duration of leakage), and most importantly, in terms of possible reason for the leakage. After the source code (and subsequently the compiled code) has been sanitized, attack attempts complement the methodology to test the implementation against realistic exploitations. This last steps allows to validate whether the tolerated leakages during the sanitizing stage are indeed benign.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Secure-IC S.A.S., 15 Rue Claude Chappe, Bât. B, 35 510, Cesson-Sévigné, France

    Youssef Souissi, Adrien Facon & Sylvain Guilley

  2. École Normale Supérieure, Département d’informatique, 75 005, Paris, France

    Adrien Facon & Sylvain Guilley

  3. LTCI, Télécom ParisTech, Institut Polytechnique de Paris, 75 013, Paris, France

    Sylvain Guilley

Authors
  1. Youssef Souissi
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  2. Adrien Facon
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  3. Sylvain Guilley
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Sylvain Guilley .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Université Paris 8, Saint-Denis, France

    Claude Carlet

  2. Institut MINES-TELECOM, Paris, France

    Sylvain Guilley

  3. Université de Caen, Caen, France

    Abderrahmane Nitaj

  4. Mohammed V University, Rabat, Morocco

    El Mamoun Souidi

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Souissi, Y., Facon, A., Guilley, S. (2019). Virtual Security Evaluation. In: Carlet, C., Guilley, S., Nitaj, A., Souidi, E. (eds) Codes, Cryptology and Information Security. C2SI 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11445. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16458-4_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16458-4_1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-16457-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-16458-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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