Skip to main content

A Study on Mitigation Techniques for SCADA-Driven Cyber-Physical Systems (Position Paper)

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Foundations and Practice of Security (FPS 2018)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11358))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) integrate programmable computing and communication capabilities to traditional physical environments. The use of SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) technologies to build such a new generation of CPSs plays an important role in current critical national-wide infrastructures. SCADA-driven CPSs can be disrupted by cyber-physical attacks, putting at risk human safety, environmental regulation and industrial work. In this paper, we address the aforementioned issues and provide a discussion on the mitigation techniques that aim to optimize the recovery response when a SCADA-driven CPS is under attack. Our discussion paves the way for novel cyber resilience techniques, focusing on the programmable computing and communication capabilities of CPSs, towards new research directions to tolerate cyber-physical attacks.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 59.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 74.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  1. Security considerations for reflection: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/reflection-and-codedom/security-considerations-for-reflection. Accessed 23 Aug 2018

  2. Cavalli, A.R., Ortiz, A.M., Ouffoué, G., Sanchez, C.A., Zaïdi, F.: Design of a secure shield for internet and web-based services using software reflection. In: Jin, H., Wang, Q., Zhang, L.-J. (eds.) ICWS 2018. LNCS, vol. 10966, pp. 472–486. Springer, Cham (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94289-6_30

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  3. Cómbita, L.F., Giraldo, J., Cárdenas, A.A., Quijano, N.: Response and reconfiguration of cyber-physical control systems: a survey. In: 2015 IEEE 2nd Colombian Conference on Automatic Control (CCAC), pp. 1–6. IEEE (2015)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Kim, C.: Cyber-resilient industrial control system with diversified architecture and bus monitoring. In: 2016 World Congress on Industrial Control Systems Security (WCICSS), pp. 1–6. IEEE (2016)

    Google Scholar 

  5. Oracle, J.D.: The reflection API. https://docs.oracle.com/javase/tutorial/reflect/. Accessed 23 Aug 2018

  6. Ouffoué, G., Zaidi, F., Cavalli, A.R., Lallali, M.: How web services can be tolerant to intruders through diversification. In: 2017 IEEE International Conference on Web Services (ICWS), pp. 436–443. IEEE (2017)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Ouffoué, G., Zaidi, F., Cavalli, A.R., Lallali, M.: Model-based attack tolerance. In: 2017 31st International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications Workshops (WAINA), pp. 68–73. IEEE (2017)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Piedrahita, A.F.M., Gaur, V., Giraldo, J., Cardenas, A.A., Rueda, S.J.: Virtual incident response functions in control systems. Comput. Netw. 135, 147–159 (2018)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Rubio-Hernan, J., De Cicco, L., Garcia-Alfaro, J.: Event-triggered watermarking control to handle cyber-physical integrity attacks. In: Brumley, B.B., Röning, J. (eds.) NordSec 2016. LNCS, vol. 10014, pp. 3–19. Springer, Cham (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47560-8_1

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  10. Rubio-Hernan, J., De Cicco, L., Garcia-Alfaro, J.: Revisiting a watermark-based detection scheme to handle cyber-physical attacks. In: 2016 11th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES), pp. 21–28. IEEE (2016)

    Google Scholar 

  11. Rubio-Hernan, J., De Cicco, L., Garcia-Alfaro, J.: On the use of watermark-based schemes to detect cyber-physical attacks. EURASIP J. Inf. Secur. 2017(1), 8 (2017)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  12. Rubio-Hernan, J., De Cicco, L., Garcia-Alfaro, J.: Adaptive control-theoretic detection of integrity attacks against cyber-physical industrial systems. Trans. Emerg. Telecommun. Technol. 29(7), e3209 (2018)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  13. Rubio-Hernan, J., Sahay, R., De Cicco, L., Garcia-Alfaro, J.: Cyber-physical architecture assisted by programmable networking. Internet Technol. Lett. 1(4), 44 (2018)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  14. Sousa, P., Bessani, A.N., Correia, M., Neves, N.F., Verissimo, P.: Resilient intrusion tolerance through proactive and reactive recovery. In: 13th Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing (PRDC 2007), pp. 373–380 (2007)

    Google Scholar 

  15. Teruel, C., Ducasse, S., Cassou, D., Denker, M.: Access control to reflection with object ownership. In: Proceedings of the 11th Symposium on Dynamic Languages, DLS 2015, pp. 168–176. ACM, New York (2015)

    Google Scholar 

  16. Veríssimo, P.E., Neves, N.F., Correia, M.P.: Intrusion-tolerant architectures: concepts and design. In: de Lemos, R., Gacek, C., Romanovsky, A. (eds.) WADS 2002. LNCS, vol. 2677, pp. 3–36. Springer, Heidelberg (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45177-3_1

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

The authors acknowledge support from the Cyber CNI chair of the Institut Mines-Télécom. The chair is supported by Airbus Defence and Space, Amossys, EDF, Orange, La Poste, Nokia, Société Générale and the Regional Council of Brittany. The chair has been acknowledged by the Center of excellence in Cybersecurity. The authors also acknowledge support from the European Commission, in the framework of the H2020 SPARTA project, under grant agreement 830892.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Joaquin Garcia-Alfaro .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this paper

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this paper

Segovia, M., Cavalli, A.R., Cuppens, N., Garcia-Alfaro, J. (2019). A Study on Mitigation Techniques for SCADA-Driven Cyber-Physical Systems (Position Paper). In: Zincir-Heywood, N., Bonfante, G., Debbabi, M., Garcia-Alfaro, J. (eds) Foundations and Practice of Security. FPS 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11358. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18419-3_17

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18419-3_17

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-18418-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-18419-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics