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Pseudorandom Functions from LWE: RKA Security and Application

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Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2019)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11547))

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Abstract

Pseudorandom Functions (PRF) is a basic primitive in cryptography. In this paper, we study related key attacks (RKA) with which the adversary is able to choose function \(\phi \) and observe the behavior of the PRF under the modified secret key \(\phi (k)\). We focus on the PRF from the Learning with Errors (LWE) assumption by Banerjee and Peikert in CRYPTO 2014. We prove that the PRF is secure against unique-input key shift attacks and restricted affine attacks. After that, we use this RKA-secure PRF to construct a robustly reusable fuzzy extractor, which enjoys higher efficiency and better error correction rate.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See [6] for the definitions and instantiations of \(\mathsf {SS}\) and \(\mathcal {H}_{\mathcal {I}}\).

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Acknowledgments

This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC Nos.61672346 and U1636217) and National Key R&D Program of China (No. 2016YFB0801201).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, 200240, China

    Nan Cui, Shengli Liu, Yunhua Wen & Dawu Gu

  2. State Key Laboratory of Cryptology, P.O. Box 5159, Beijing, 100878, China

    Nan Cui & Shengli Liu

  3. Westone Cryptologic Research Center, Beijing, 100070, China

    Shengli Liu

Authors
  1. Nan Cui
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  2. Shengli Liu
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  3. Yunhua Wen
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  4. Dawu Gu
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Shengli Liu .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand

    Julian Jang-Jaccard

  2. University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

    Fuchun Guo

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Cui, N., Liu, S., Wen, Y., Gu, D. (2019). Pseudorandom Functions from LWE: RKA Security and Application. In: Jang-Jaccard, J., Guo, F. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11547. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21548-4_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21548-4_13

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-21548-4

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