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Reciprocity and Rule Preferences of a Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA) in China: Evolutionary Simulation in Imitation Games

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Group Decision and Negotiation: Behavior, Models, and Support (GDN 2019)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing ((LNBIP,volume 351))

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Abstract

As one method of cooperation in human society, informal financial institutions, such as a ROSCA, demonstrate huge rule disparities temporally and geographically. In this paper, we attempt to understand whether and how people’s preference of a ROSCA is related to the reciprocity level in a particular society. After conducting evolutionary imitation games among the population, the results show that each ROSCA rule evolves as if it finds its niche formed by the peoples’ different levels of reciprocity. Our simulation also reproduced the social states where different ROSCAs co-exist with others at an equilibrium even when some rules clearly dominate others. These results provide a new insight into the theory of collective rule choice that triggers the evolution of cooperation.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of International Studies, Graduate School of Frontier Sciences, The University of Tokyo, Kashiwa, Japan

    Zhao Sijia & Masahide Horita

Authors
  1. Zhao Sijia
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  2. Masahide Horita
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Zhao Sijia .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. CDSID - Center for Decision Systems and Information Development, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE), Recife, Brazil

    Danielle Costa Morais

  2. Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK

    Ashley Carreras

  3. CDSID - Center for Decision Systems and Information Development, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE), Recife, Brazil

    Adiel Teixeira de Almeida

  4. University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria

    Rudolf Vetschera

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Sijia, Z., Horita, M. (2019). Reciprocity and Rule Preferences of a Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA) in China: Evolutionary Simulation in Imitation Games. In: Morais, D., Carreras, A., de Almeida, A., Vetschera, R. (eds) Group Decision and Negotiation: Behavior, Models, and Support. GDN 2019. Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, vol 351. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21711-2_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21711-2_4

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-21710-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-21711-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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