Abstract
We consider a dynamic, discrete-time, game model where the players use a common resource and have different criteria to optimize. The coalition formation process in dynamic multicriteria games is considered. The characteristic function is constructed in two unusual forms under the assumption of informed players: all players decide simultaneously or members of coalitions are assumed to be the leaders and players decide sequentially. Internal and external stability concepts are adopted for dynamic multicriteria games to obtain new stability conditions. To illustrate the presented approaches a multicriteria bioresource management problem with a finite horizon is investigated.
This work was supported by the Russian Science Foundation, project no. 17-11-01079.
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Rettieva, A. (2019). Coalition Stability in Dynamic Multicriteria Games. In: Khachay, M., Kochetov, Y., Pardalos, P. (eds) Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research. MOTOR 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11548. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22629-9_49
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22629-9_49
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