Abstract
With the proliferation of sensor-embedded mobile devices, mobile crowdsensing has become a paradigm of significant interest. Incentivizing sensory-data providers to keep sustainability in a mobile crowdsensing system is a critical issue nowadays, and auction-based mechanisms have been proposed to motivate providers via monetary rewards. In our work, this sustainability problem is formulated as an optimization problem maximizing providers’ proportionally fair utilities with respect to their multi-dimensional fairness factors, and a fairness-aware auction mechanism is designed accordingly. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that considers multi-dimensional fairness of providers as the objective in selecting providers for the mobile crowdsensing system. In addition, we present rigorous theoretical analysis proving that our mechanism meets budget feasibility, individual rationality and truthfulness. Finally, simulations are performed to demonstrate the performance of our proposed mechanism.
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Acknowledgment
This work was supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation under Grants SP00013080 and SP00013422, National Science Foundation of China under Grant NSFC 61632010, and Heilongjiang Provincial Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant F2017027.
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Sooksatra, K., Li, R., Li, Y., Guan, X., Li, W. (2019). Fairness-Aware Auction Mechanism for Sustainable Mobile Crowdsensing. In: Biagioni, E., Zheng, Y., Cheng, S. (eds) Wireless Algorithms, Systems, and Applications. WASA 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11604. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23597-0_25
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23597-0_25
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