Abstract
We devise new techniques for design and analysis of efficient lattice-based zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP). First, we introduce one-shot proof techniques for non-linear polynomial relations of degree \(k\ge 2\), where the protocol achieves a negligible soundness error in a single execution, and thus performs significantly better in both computation and communication compared to prior protocols requiring multiple repetitions. Such proofs with degree \(k\ge 2\) have been crucial ingredients for important privacy-preserving protocols in the discrete logarithm setting, such as Bulletproofs (IEEE S&P ’18) and arithmetic circuit arguments (EUROCRYPT ’16). In contrast, one-shot proofs in lattice-based cryptography have previously only been shown for the linear case (\(k=1\)) and a very specific quadratic case (\(k=2\)), which are obtained as a special case of our technique.
Moreover, we introduce two speedup techniques for lattice-based ZKPs: a CRT-packing technique supporting “inter-slot” operations, and “NTT-friendly” tools that permit the use of fully-splitting rings. The former technique comes at almost no cost to the proof length, and the latter one barely increases it, which can be compensated for by tweaking the rejection sampling parameters while still having faster computation overall.
To illustrate the utility of our techniques, we show how to use them to build efficient relaxed proofs for important relations, namely proof of commitment to bits, one-out-of-many proof, range proof and set membership proof. Despite their relaxed nature, we further show how our proof systems can be used as building blocks for advanced cryptographic tools such as ring signatures.
Our ring signature achieves a dramatic improvement in length over all the existing proposals from lattices at the same security level. The computational evaluation also shows that our construction is highly likely to outperform all the relevant works in running times. Being efficient in both aspects, our ring signature is particularly suitable for both small-scale and large-scale applications such as cryptocurrencies and e-voting systems. No trusted setup is required for any of our proposals.
Keywords
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- 1.
Here, we overlook the fact that some parts of the commitment matrix are zero or identity, but this does not change the asymptotic behaviour in Table 2.
- 2.
A concurrent work [21] has recently been put on ePrint, and it builds a linear-sized (linkable) ring signature. Even though “a less efficient version that is based on standard lattice problems” (in particular, SIS and Inhomogeneous SIS) is described, there are no concrete parameters provided for that scheme. The provided concrete instantiation, of size 1.3N KB for N ring members, relies on NTRU assumption and claims 103-bit security against quantum attackers. We restrict our comparison in Table 1 to those based on “standard lattice problems”. Nevertheless, even the NTRU-based scheme produces longer ring signatures than ours when \(N\ge 43\).
- 3.
Note that \(N=1\) would simply give an ordinary signature, and there is no reason for using a ring signature for that purpose.
- 4.
In [20], the soundness goal of \(\lambda ^{\omega (1)}\) is used and so the number of protocol repetitions for Stern’s framework is taken to be \(\omega (\log \lambda )\), which disappears in \(\widetilde{O}(\cdot )\) notation. But, we consider a practice-oriented goal for the soundness error of \(2^{-\lambda }\), and thus the number of protocol repetitions for Stern-based proofs must be \(\Omega (\lambda )\). Also, it is stated in [18] that they have the same asymptotic signature growth with [20].
- 5.
- 6.
In this work, we consider a challenge space size of \(2^{2\lambda }\) for \(\lambda \)-bit post-quantum security.
- 7.
The reason behind indexing becomes clear in what follows.
- 8.
In certain proofs, the use of UMC allows the prover to respond only with the randomness part \(\varvec{z}\). In such a case, \(\varvec{f}\) need not be transmitted and can be assumed to be set appropriately by the verifier.
- 9.
Recall that UMC allows an unbounded message opening, but still the randomness is required to be short.
- 10.
We believe this is the application of CRT mentioned in [25].
- 11.
The assumption \(d\ge 128\) is put merely to use a constant factor of 2 when bounding the Euclidean norm of a vector following normal distribution.
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Acknowledgement
Ron Steinfeld and Joseph K. Liu were supported in part by ARC Discovery Project grant DP180102199.
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Esgin, M.F., Steinfeld, R., Liu, J.K., Liu, D. (2019). Lattice-Based Zero-Knowledge Proofs: New Techniques for Shorter and Faster Constructions and Applications. In: Boldyreva, A., Micciancio, D. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2019. CRYPTO 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11692. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26948-7_5
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